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LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE IN WASHINGTON:  
FROM HERSKOVITS TO MOHR AND THE NEED FOR 
CLARIFICATION 
Matthew Wurdeman 
Abstract: Loss of chance is a well-established tort doctrine that seeks to balance 
traditional tort causation principles with the need to provide a remedy to patients whose 
injuries or illnesses are seriously exacerbated by physician negligence.  In Washington, the 
doctrine continues to create significant difficulties for judges, juries, and practitioners. 
Wherever it has been applied, it has often created difficulties. The loss-of-chance doctrine 
needs clarification—definitive, sensible, and workable guidelines to ensure that loss of 
chance is consistently and fairly applied. Part of the problem lies in the fact that courts and 
litigants use the term “loss of chance” as if it has a single, fixed meaning, when in fact it is an 
umbrella term that covers three separate—though sometimes overlapping—theories of 
recovery. This Comment first identifies and explains the different meanings attached to loss 
of chance, and briefly describe its varying implementation among states over the past three 
decades. Next, it tracks the evolution of loss-of-chance doctrine in Washington State from its 
inception to its current ambiguous status. Then this Comment analyzes the difficulties arising 
from ambiguities in the Washington State Supreme Court’s decisions in Herskovits v. Group 
Health Coop. of Puget Sound and Mohr v. Grantham, as well as and the recent Washington 
State Court of Appeals for Division III decision in Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin 
Anesthesia, PLLC. The critique of these three cases underscores the extent to which 
ambiguities in loss-of-chance doctrine currently lead to inconsistent and unpredictable 
standards of causation and burdens of proof. This Comment concludes by suggesting 
concrete solutions to create a coherent and equitable doctrine that will allow plaintiffs to 
recover for loss of chance without creating incentives for unfair manipulation of common 
law tort standards. In order to illustrate the workability of these suggestions, this Comment 
applies them to the facts of Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC. While 
this Comment focuses primarily on Washington State law, the solutions presented are 
applicable in any jurisdiction that struggles with the loss-of-chance doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
Loss of chance is a well-established tort doctrine, and yet it remains 
something of a mystery. Loss of chance allows a plaintiff to recover for 
a lost opportunity to survive or recover from an injury or illness due to 
the negligence of a defendant, typically a physician.1 When it applies, 
the doctrine stretches traditional causation boundaries, allowing recovery 
to plaintiffs who were never more likely than not to survive their illness 
1. Alice Férot, The Theory of Loss of Chance: Between Reticence and Acceptance, 8 FIU L. REV. 
591, 591–92 (2013). 
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or injury.2 Such plaintiffs would have no viable claim under a rigid 
interpretation of common law tort principles.3 Although the concept is 
simple, and there is widespread agreement among states on the general 
principles of the doctrine, in practice courts have struggled to develop 
consistent, workable rules for loss of chance. Similarly, legal scholars 
underestimated the complexity of this doctrine. In the almost fifty years 
since loss of chance was first addressed by a federal court sitting in 
diversity in Hicks v. United States,4 scholars have given little attention to 
the doctrine beyond its basic contours. Much of the scholarship 
advocates for the adoption or rejection of the doctrine as a whole.5  Yet 
in loss of chance cases, details matter. 
This Comment critiques the struggle for coherence in the 
development of Washington State’s loss-of-chance doctrine, and offers 
concrete suggestions to ameliorate the inequities and inconsistencies in 
current doctrine. While this Comment focuses on Washington law, these 
suggestions are also relevant to other jurisdictions encountering similar 
difficulties. 
The 1983 decision in Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of 
Puget Sound6 is a landmark case for loss-of-chance precedent.7 A staple 
in many torts casebooks,8 Herskovits addresses three potential 
approaches to the loss-of-chance doctrine—the all-or-nothing approach,9 
the substantial-factor approach,10 and the proportional approach.11 
Herskovits officially incorporated loss-of-chance doctrine into 
2. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 619, 664 P.2d 
474, 479 (1983) (allowing a 14% loss of chance of survival to go to the jury on proximate cause). 
3. Id.  
4. 368 F.2d 626, 633 (4th Cir. 1966). 
5. See, e.g., Férot, supra note 1, at 621 (suggesting legislation on loss of chance may be the best 
option); Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving 
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1396–97 (1981) (advocating 
for adoption of the loss-of-chance doctrine). 
6. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474. 
7. Id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479.  
8. See, e.g., JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 211–18 (2d ed. 2008) (using 
Herskovits to explain loss of chance); RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 482–
91 (6th ed. 1995) (same); FARNSWORTH & GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS 317–32 (2004) 
(same); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 279–84 (12th ed. 2010) 
(same). 
9. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 614, 623–25, 632–34, 664 P.2d at 476–77, 481–82, 485–87 
(addressing the all-or-nothing approach). 
10. See id. at 614–19, 664 P.2d at 477–79 (addressing the substantial-factor approach). 
11. See id. at 624–35, 664 P.2d at 481–87 (Pearson, J., concurring) (addressing the proportional 
approach). 
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Washington State law, at least in cases where a physician’s negligence is 
one cause of a patient’s death.12 However, the court divided on whether 
to employ the substantial factor or proportional approach.13 The lead 
opinion employed the substantial factor approach, which is a theory of 
causation even if the lost chance is less than even.14 The concurrence 
employed the proportional approach, which is a theory of valuation—it 
determines what the lost chance is worth.15 
Almost thirty years later, in Mohr v. Grantham,16 the Washington 
State Supreme Court again addressed the loss-of-chance doctrine.17 The 
Court officially adopted the Herskovits concurrence’s proportional 
approach for the loss of a less than even chance, and extended the 
doctrine to include loss of chance of a better outcome in situations where 
patients survive negligent care but sustain serious injuries.18 It seems as 
if the Court intended Mohr to clarify the loose ends of Herskovits. In 
fact, however, Mohr created more problems than it solved, potentially 
sowing confusion in future cases. 
A recent Washington State Court of Appeals case, Estate of Dormaier 
v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC,19 illustrates the practical effects of 
the many unanswered questions of Herskovits and Mohr.20 In an 
internally contradictory opinion, Dormaier utilizes all three loss of 
chance approaches to different ends, depending on the issue it is trying 
to resolve.21 The Dormaier opinion demonstrates the need for 
clarification and distinct boundaries to help guide trial courts, 
practitioners, and juries. 
In Part I, this Comment first defines the loss of chance, and then 
12. See id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479 (lead opinion) (holding that a 14% reduction of chance of 
survival is sufficient evidence to go to the jury). 
13. See id. at 619–20, 664 P.2d at 479 (Pearson, J., concurring) (agreeing with the court’s lead 
opinion, but not its reasoning).  
14. See id. at 614–19, 664 P.2d at 476–79 (lead opinion) (employing the substantial-factor 
approach).  
15. See id. at 631–35, 664 P.2d at 485–87 (Pearson, J., concurring) (employing the proportional 
approach). 
16. 172 Wash. 2d 844, 262 P.3d 490 (2011). 
17. See id. at 846–47, 262 P.3d at 491 (“This case compels consideration of whether, in the 
medical malpractice context, there is a cause of action for a lost chance, even when the ultimate 
result is some serious harm short of death.”).  
18. Id. at 857, 262 P.3d at 496. 
19. 177 Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013). 
20. See id. at 844–47, 313 P.3d at 438–39 (addressing the questions remaining after Herskovits 
and Mohr). 
21. See id. at 844–70, 313 P.3d at 438–51 (employing the all-or-noting, substantial factor, and 
proportional approaches); see also infra Part II.D.1.  
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identifies and explains the five distinct doctrines for which the 
seemingly unitary label “loss of chance” has come to stand. It then 
demonstrates the uneven implementation of the different approaches 
among the states. 
Part II traces the history of the loss-of-chance doctrine in Washington 
focusing primarily on Herskovits, and the more recent decisions in Mohr 
and Dormaier. Following its discussion of each case, this Comment 
highlights unresolved legal questions and demonstrates their potential 
negative implications in future cases. Parts I and II, taken together, 
explain the source of the confusion in loss-of-chance doctrine in 
Washington medical malpractice cases. 
Part III of this Comment offers a coherent, predictable framework for 
Washington courts as they consider future loss of chance cases. It 
provides specific solutions to the problems inherent in Mohr and 
Dormaier. While this Comment’s solutions are specific to the 
proportional approach as it stands in Washington State, the reasoning 
behind them is applicable in any jurisdiction currently struggling with 
loss of chance. 
Finally, Part IV demonstrates the feasibility of implementing the 
proposed solutions by applying these solutions to the facts of Dormaier. 
Part IV clearly lays out what would be required of a plaintiff’s attorney 
in order to successfully bring a loss of chance claim, and provides 
guidance to trial courts on how to handle the claim. 
I. LOSS OF CHANCE: COURTS BLUR CAUSATION 
BOUNDARIES TO BENEFIT PLAINTIFFS 
The loss-of-chance doctrine has been frequently misunderstood.22 In 
part, this misconception arises from the term itself. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines the loss-of-chance doctrine as “a rule in some states 
providing a claim against a doctor who has engaged in medical 
malpractice that, although it does not result in a particular injury, 
decreases or eliminates the chance of surviving or recovering from the 
preexisting condition for which the doctor was consulted.”23 In the 
medical malpractice context, loss of chance is most frequently applied in 
cases of misdiagnoses, where a timely diagnosis would have given the 
patient a statistically better opportunity to achieve a more favorable 
22. See Férot, supra note 1, at 591 (“[W]herever [loss of chance] is implemented, it tends to 
be . . . misunderstood . . . .”). 
23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (9th ed. 2009). 
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outcome.24 For example, a patient arrives at the doctor’s office with a 
complaint and, due to a breach of the applicable standard of care, the 
doctor makes an incorrect diagnosis or fails to make a diagnosis. 
Sometime later, the patient is properly diagnosed. Had the patient been 
properly diagnosed at the outset, her chances of recovery would have 
been 40%. However, due to the delayed diagnosis, the patient’s chances 
of recovery are now 10%. This classic example of loss of chance is 
deceptively intuitive. In fact, it conceals the complexity of the doctrine. 
In practice, loss of chance is an umbrella term, the meaning of which 
varies between jurisdictions25 and sometimes—as in Washington—even 
within jurisdictions.26 For example, in medical malpractice cases—the 
paradigmatic loss of chance context—there are currently no less than 
five different approaches to loss of chance, the differences between 
which can affect whether a plaintiff has a viable cause of action in a 
particular case. This Part explains those five approaches. 
A. Approaches to the Loss-of-Chance Doctrine 
Much of the confusion surrounding loss of chance centers on whether 
it is classified as a theory of causation or an injury in and of itself.27 The 
“traditional approach” or “all-or-nothing” approach does not recognize 
the loss of a less-than-even chance at all. The “substantial factor” 
approach deals with loss of chance as a type of causation. The 
“proportional approach” classifies the lost chance as the injury itself, and 
damages are based on the percentage of chance lost. Two states, 
Michigan and South Dakota, passed legislation on loss of chance, 
abrogating state Supreme Court decisions that recognized the loss-of-
chance doctrine.28 Three states—Oregon, Utah, and Rhode Island—have 
yet to rule on the loss-of-chance doctrine.29 To aid in explaining the 
24. See King, supra note 5, at 1363–64 (illustrating a hypothetical in which a misdiagnosis led to 
a 30% lost chance of survival). 
25. See generally Férot, supra note 1, at 609–17 (discussing the different approaches); Joseph 
King, “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance 
Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 492, 505–11 (1998) (same). 
26. See infra Part II.  
27. See King, supra note 25, at 494 (acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing between 
causation and valuation). 
28. Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56–57 (Mich. 1990), superseded by statute, 1993 
Mich. Pub. Acts 411; Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, (S.D. 2000), superseded by statute, 
2002 S.D. Sess. Laws 176. 
29. Mandros v. Prescod, 948 A.2d 304, 311 (R.I. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that because the loss-of-
chance doctrine affects only the causation part of the tort analysis and because the jury never was 
required to reach the question of causation, the trial justice’s failure to instruct on the loss-of-chance 
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various approaches, this Comment uses the facts from Herskovits v. 
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, in which the parties 
stipulated to an assumption that the doctor’s negligence caused a 14% 
loss of chance of survival and that the decedent’s pre-negligence chances 
of survival were less than 50%.30 
1. The “Traditional” or “All-or-Nothing” Approach 
One of the criticisms of the loss-of-chance doctrine is the speculative 
nature of the harm.31 For example, if a doctor misdiagnoses a patient for 
cancer, and the patient later dies, it is almost impossible to know with 
certainty whether the patient would have lived had a timely diagnosis 
been made.32 Furthermore, and more importantly, the cause of the 
patient’s death was cancer.33 The doctor’s negligence did not give the 
patient cancer but only impacted his or her chances of survival. The 
“traditional approach,” therefore, refuses to acknowledge loss of chance 
because the doctrine goes against “traditional principles of tort 
causation.”34 
Some states have adopted a form of loss-of-chance doctrine called the 
“all-or-nothing”35 approach.36 Under the all-or-nothing approach, the 
doctrine is moot.”); Joshi v. Providence Health Sys. of Oregon Corp., 149 P.3d 1164, 1170 (Or. 
2006) (holding that under the wrongful death statute, causation cannot be proven by showing an 
increased risk of death, and therefore the lost chance argument did not apply); Seale v. Gowans, 923 
P.2d 1361, 1365 (Utah 1996) (holding that the case was barred by the statute of limitations, but 
stating in dicta that the loss of chance, without proof of actual damages, was insufficient to sustain a 
cause of action).  
30. See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 619, 664 P.2d 474, 
479 (1983) (finding that both parties agreed that the Court assume Mr. Herskovits’s chance of 
survival was 39%, and the doctor’s negligence reduced the chance to 25%, or a reduction of 14%). 
31. See Férot, supra note 1, at 600 (“The loss of chance, as an injury, is often criticized for being 
no more than a speculative harm.”).  
32. See, e.g., id. (“The identification of the injury . . . . requires making assumptions about what 
should have been the course of events in the absence of the tortious act.”).  
33. See, e.g., Mohr v. Grantham, 172 Wash. 2d 844, 873–74, 262 P.3d 490, 504 (2011) (Johnson, 
J., dissenting) (reasoning that the plaintiff crashing her car caused her ultimate injury, not the 
medical professionals). 
34. United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Del. 1994); see also Cooper v. Sisters of 
Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E. 2d 97, 103 (Ohio 1971) (“We consider the better rule to be that 
in order to comport with the standard of proof of proximate cause, plaintiff in a malpractice case 
must prove that defendant’s negligence, in probability, proximately caused the death.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
35. The “traditional” and “all-or-nothing” approaches are essentially interchangeable. See King, 
supra note 25, at 505–06 (using the two terms interchangeably).  
36. See Férot, supra note 1, at 611. 
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patient’s lost chance must have been greater than even.37 Technically, 
this is a rejection of the loss-of-chance doctrine, as a loss of a greater-
than-even chance comports with traditional tort notions of causation; in 
other words the doctor’s negligence more probably than not caused the 
patient’s death or poor outcome.38 Under such an approach, a plaintiff 
who lost a 50% or less chance at a better outcome has no remedy.39 For 
a plaintiff who shows a loss of a 51% or greater chance, the issue can go 
to the jury on proximate cause.40 The “all-or-nothing” approach treats 
the lost chance as satisfying the burden of proof for causation.41 
Eighteen states plus the District of Columbia take this approach.42 Using 
the 14% loss of chance above, the plaintiff would have no remedy under 
37. See id. at 611–15. 
38. See, e.g., Ladner v. Campbell, 515 So. 2d 882, 888–89 (Miss. 1987) (“Mississippi law does 
not permit recovery of damages because of mere diminishment of the ‘chance of recovery.’ 
Recovery is allowed only when the failure of the physician to render the required level of care 
results in the loss of a reasonable probability of substantial improvement of the plaintiff’s 
condition.” (quoting Clayton v. Thompson, 475 So. 2d 439, 445 (Miss. 1985))). 
39. Stephen Brennwald, Proving Causation in “Loss of a Chance” Cases: A Proportional 
Approach, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 766 (1985) (“[This] approach requires the finder of fact to 
determine whether the decedent’s chances to live or to achieve a more favorable result were more 
probable than not. Once the evidence shows that a probability did or did not exist, the inquiry ends. 
As a result, chances of less than fifty-one percent are treated as if they were nonexistent.”); see also 
Rankin v. Stetson, 749 N.W.2d 460, 469 (Neb. 2008) (“While a 49-percent chance of a better 
recovery may be medically significant, it does not meet the legal requirements for proof of 
causation.”).  
40. See, e.g., Stetson, 749 N.W.2d at 469 (“[A]n opinion expressed in terms that it is more likely 
than not that a plaintiff ‘would have had a better outcome’ is sufficiently certain to establish 
causation.”). 
41. See King, supra note 25, at 505–06 (stating that a plaintiff may prove causation for the 
ultimate harm if the lost opportunity was greater than 50%). 
42. The all-or-nothing approach is currently used in Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and the District of Columbia. See Férot, supra note 1, 
at 611 (listing states that have adopted the all-or-nothing approach); Stephen Koch, Whose Loss Is It 
Anyway? Effects of the “Lost-Chance” Doctrine on Civil Litigation and Medical Malpractice 
Insurance, 88 N.C. L. REV. 595, 607–08 nn.57–59 (2010) (same); see also Boone v. William W. 
Backus Hosp., 864 A.2d 1, 18 (Conn. 2005) (“[I]t is not sufficient for a lost chance plaintiff to prove 
merely that a defendant’s negligent conduct has deprived him or her of some chance; in 
Connecticut, such plaintiff must prove that the negligent conduct more likely than not affected the 
actual outcome.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Phillips v. E. Maine 
Med. Ctr., 565 A.2d 306, 308 (Me. 1989) (allowing a medical malpractice claim to go forward after 
plaintiff provided evidence that, absent the doctor’s negligence, patient would have had a better than 
even chance of survival); Ladner v. Campbell, 515 So. 2d 882, 888 (Miss. 1987) (“Mississippi law 
does not permit the recovery of damages because of mere diminishment of the ‘chance of 
recovery’ . . . . [A cause of action] is allowed only when the failure of the physician to render the 
required level of care results in the loss of a reasonable probability of substantial improvement of 
the plaintiff’s condition.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
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the “traditional” or “all-or-nothing” approach, as he was more likely 
than not going to die anyway. 
2. The “Substantial Factor” Approach 
Perhaps the most controversial43 of the approaches, the “substantial 
factor” approach, allows for the lost chance—irrespective of the actual 
percentage lost—to go to the jury on the issue of proximate cause 
provided that the lost chance was a substantial factor in bringing about 
the harm.44 The Supreme Court of Kansas held that “the loss of chance 
of recovery theory basically entails the adoption of a different standard 
of causation than usually applies in negligence cases.”45 And the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the loss-of-chance doctrine 
“relax[es] the standard for sufficiency of proof of causation ordinarily 
required of a plaintiff.”46 Thus, the 14% lost chance used above may 
impose liability on the defendant, as the jury is free to determine 
whether the lost chance was a substantial factor in bringing about the 
harm. This is also known as the “relaxed causation approach” and is 
criticized as an exception to traditional causation standards.47 Five states 
adhere to this theory.48 
43. See, e.g., King, supra note 25, at 508 (“[This] approach represents the worst of both 
worlds.”). 
44. See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 613–14, 664 P.2d 
474, 476 (1983) (discussing the relationship between an increased risk of harm and death). 
45. Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 182 (Kan. 1994). 
46. McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 471 (Okla. 1987).  
47. See, e.g., United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Del. 1994) (commenting that 
the “relaxed causation approach” is an exception to traditional causation requirements); Herskovits, 
99 Wash. 2d at 38, 664 P.2d at 489 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting) (“[A]pplication of the substantial 
factor test in these circumstances is truly novel.”); Reigel v. SavaSeniorCare L.L.C., 292 P.3d 977, 
987 (Colo. App. 2011) (holding that a possible increase in chance of harm being an issue of 
causation is inconsistent with the traditional but-for test).  
48. The relaxed causation approach is currently used in Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, North 
Dakota, and Pennsylvania. See Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 187 (Kan. 1994) (holding that a 
substantial loss of chance is sufficient to withstand summary judgment); McKellips v. Saint Francis 
Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 475 (Okla. 1987) (“[T]he jury may determine that the tortious act of 
malpractice was in turn a substantial factor in causing a patient’s injury or death.”); Sharp v. Kaiser 
Found. Health Plan, 710 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Colo. App. 1985) (“Once a plaintiff has introduced 
evidence that a defendant’s negligen[ce] . . . substantially increased the risk of harm . . . , and that 
the harm in fact has been sustained, it becomes a question of fact for the jury to determine whether 
that increased risk of harm was a substantial factor in producing the harm.”), aff’d on other grounds, 
741 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1987); VanVleet v. Pfeifle, 289 N.W.2d 781, 784 (N.D. 1980) (“[I]f the doctors 
in this case were negligent in failing to discover Donald VanVleet’s cancerous condition and 
thereby hastened and prematurely caused his death, the doctors should not be able to escape liability 
simply because the cancer would eventually have resulted in VanVleet’s death even if it were 
discovered sooner.”); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1289 (Pa. 1978) (“[L]iability could attach 
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3. The “Proportional” Approach 
Under the proportional approach, the loss of chance itself is the 
actionable injury.49 Here the patient’s lost opportunity for a better 
outcome is the compensable injury, not the patient’s final outcome.50 To 
prevail, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, and that the provider’s 
negligence proximately caused the loss of chance.51 The negative 
outcome and the loss of chance are two distinct injuries.52 However, 
courts typically award damages if the patient suffers the negative 
outcome in addition to the lost chance.53 Otherwise it is difficult to 
reasonably calculate damages. For example, if a doctor causes a 20% 
reduction in a person’s chances of surviving cancer, and that person dies, 
the damages will be 20% of what the wrongful death damages would 
have been had the doctor’s negligence been the cause-in-fact of the 
death.54 This approach to loss of chance is not inevitable. For example, 
courts could award damages for loss of chance based on mental 
anguish55 or a more difficult recovery process, rather than confining 
recovery to the negative outcome itself.56 Twenty-two states have 
adopted this approach.57 
if the negligence of the defendant were but a substantial factor in bringing about the death.”).  
49. See Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d at 1100 (commenting that the proportional approach 
compensates the lost chance); Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 623–24, 664 P.2d at 481 (conceiving the 
injury as the reduced chance of survival).  
50. See Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d at 1102 (noting that the proportional approach calls for the 
redefinition of the injury as the lost chance and not the physical harm); Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 
624, 664 P.2d at 481 (“[If] we perceive the death of Mr. Herskovits as the injury in this case, we 
must affirm the trial court . . . .”); Férot, supra note 1, at 596. 
51. Férot, supra note 1, at 595.  
52. See id. at 596 (“[T]he loss of chance causes an injury independent from the unfavorable 
outcome.”). 
53. Id. at 596–97. 
54. King, supra note 4, at 1381–82. 
55. DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W. 2d 131, 139 (Iowa 1986) (recognizing mental anguish as a 
basis for damages because the patient “knew her cancer was incurable and her days were 
numbered”).  
56. See, e.g., Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 281 (Ind. 2000) (holding that worsening of 
the patient’s condition was compensable even though he did not die, because while the cancer 
remained undiagnosed, the plaintiff suffered the loss of healthy lung tissue, the collapse of a lung, 
and the growth of a malignant tumor); Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56 n.43 (Mich. 
1990) (noting that harm could be the worsening of the patient’s condition prior to remission), 
superseded by statute, 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 411, as recognized in O’Neal v. St. John Hosp. & 
Med. Ctr., 791 N.W. 2d 853, 857–58 (Mich. 2010).  
57. The proportional approach is currently used in Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
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4. The Legislative Approach 
The Supreme Courts of both Michigan and South Dakota approved 
the loss-of-chance doctrine.58 However, following those decisions the 
state legislatures passed laws repudiating this judicially created cause of 
action.59 The Michigan Legislature specifically stated that recovery 
would not be allowed for a “loss of an opportunity to survive or an 
opportunity to achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater 
than 50%,” which puts Michigan in the all-or-nothing category.60 South 
Dakota is also now an all-or-nothing state.61 Michigan and South Dakota 
remain the only two states that have dealt with loss of chance in the 
legislature.62 
Other states, however, are attempting to deal with the doctrine 
through legislation. In 2013 the Ohio State Legislature proposed a bill in 
which “[a]ny loss or diminution of a chance of recovery or survival by 
itself is not an injury, death, or loss to person for which damages may be 
recovered.”63 This statute was proposed explicitly to abrogate Roberts v. 
Ohio Permanente Medical Group, Inc.,64 in which the Supreme Court of 
Ohio endorsed the proportional approach to loss of chance.65 The 
Massachusetts Legislature also proposed a bill66 to abrogate the 
Wyoming. See Férot, supra note 1, at 610 (listing states that have adopted the theory); see also 
Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W. 2d 321, 337 (Minn. 2013) (recognizing plaintiff’s loss of chance 
claim); Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.2d 1103, 1106–08 (N.H. 2001) (recognizing the proportional 
approach to loss of chance). 
58. Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W. 2d 366, 372–73 (S.D. 2000), superseded by statute, 2002 S.D. 
Sess. Laws 176; Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 57. 
59. 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 411; 2002 S.D. Sess. Laws 176; see also O’Neal, 791 N.W.2d at 857 
(recognizing that 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 411 superseded Falcon). 
60. 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 411. 
61. Smith v. Bubak, 643 F.3d 1137, 1142 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[T]his result does not reveal whether 
giving a patient tPA will more likely than not cause a stroke patient to improve, which is the 
material inquiry under a traditional proximate cause regime.”).  
62. Férot, supra note 1, at 608–09.  
63. H.B. 276, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2013) (proposing to enact section 
2323.40(B). At the time of publication, this bill had been referred to the Committee House 
Judiciary.). 
64. 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996). 
65. Id. at 484 (“In order to maintain an action for the loss of a less-than-even chance of recovery 
or survival, the plaintiff must present expert medical testimony showing that the health care 
provider’s negligent act or omission increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff.”). 
66. S.B. 1038, 188th Gen. Court (Mass. 2013) (“This section is intended to prohibit the filing of 
claims or causes of action based upon the loss-of-chance doctrine adopted by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in the case of Matsuyama v. Birnbaum.”). 
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proportional approach adopted in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum.67 The bill 
states that a “plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportunity to 
survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the 
opportunity was greater than 50%.”68 If approved, this bill will put 
Massachusetts in the all-or-nothing category. New Hampshire passed 
legislation on the burden of proof in medical injury actions in 2003.69 
The statute was amended to add a third paragraph, which reads: 
The requirements of this section are not satisfied by evidence of 
loss of opportunity for a substantially better outcome. However, 
this paragraph shall not bar claims based on evidence that 
negligent conduct by the defendant medical provider or 
providers proximately caused the ultimate harm, regardless of 
the chance of survival or recovery from an underlying 
condition.70 
Some scholars have interpreted this legislation to supersede the holding 
in Lord v. Lovett,71 which recognized the proportional approach to the 
loss-of-chance doctrine.72 This Comment maintains that the statute 
expressly rejects the substantial factor approach. However, it still allows 
a cause of action when it can be shown, for example, that a physician’s 
negligence affirmatively caused the patient’s death even if the patient 
had a less than even chance of survival pre-negligence. The statute does 
not, however, abrogate the proportional approach employed in Lovett. 
5. Loss of Chance Not Addressed 
Three states have yet to rule on or formally address the loss-of-chance 
doctrine—Oregon, Utah, and Rhode Island. In Joshi v. Providence 
Health System of Oregon Corp.,73 the plaintiff did not argue loss of 
chance under the proportional approach, and therefore the Supreme 
Court of Oregon declined to rule on whether that would be a cognizable 
cause of action in the future.74 The Joshi Court did hold that loss of 
67. 890 N.E.2d 819, 823, 838–41 (Mass. 2008) (adopting the proportional approach). 
68. Mass. S.B. 1038. 
69. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 507-E:2 (2014). 
70. Id. § 507-E:2(III).  
71. 770 A.2d 1103, 1106–08 (N.H. 2001). 
72. See, e.g., Koch, supra note 42, at 607 n.57 (acknowledging the statute as superseding Lord v. 
Lovett). 
73. 149 P.3d 1164 (Or. 2006). 
74. See id. at 1170 (“We cannot accept plaintiff’s invitation to adopt [the loss of chance] theory 
brought under [Oregon’s wrongful death statute].”); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (2012) (“When the 
death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative 
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chance is incompatible with Oregon’s wrongful death statute.75 
Although the Supreme Court of Utah has never explicitly adopted or 
rejected the loss-of-chance doctrine, in Seale v. Gowans76 the Court 
stated in dicta that the loss of chance, without proof of actual damages, 
was insufficient to sustain a cause of action.77 The Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island twice refused to accept or reject the loss-of-chance 
doctrine. In 2004, the Court stated “[a]lthough we may revisit the loss-
of-chance doctrine under an appropriate factual scenario, we hold that 
for the reasons set forth here the facts presented in this case are 
inadequate.”78 The Court had another opportunity to address the loss-of-
chance doctrine in 2008, however it declined to do so because the 
physician was found not negligent, and therefore further inquiry into 
whether a chance was lost was moot.79 
II. HISTORY OF THE LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE IN 
WASHINGTON 
The Washington State Supreme Court first recognized the loss-of-
chance doctrine in Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget 
Sound.80 The Court then expanded the doctrine to include loss of chance 
of a better outcome short of death in Mohr v. Grantham.81 While Mohr 
officially adopted the Herskovits concurrence’s endorsement of the 
proportional approach,82 the doctrine in its present form is incoherent.83 
The Mohr court focused on justifying expanding the doctrine,84 but 
of the decedent . . . may maintain an action against the wrongdoer, if the decedent might have 
maintained an action, had the decedent lived, against the wrongdoer for an injury done by the same 
act or omission.”). 
75. Joshi, 149 P.3d at 1170 (“Although deprivation of a 30 percent chance of survival may 
constitute an injury, the injury that is compensable under ORS 30.020 is death.”). 
76. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996). 
77. Id. at 1365 (holding that the case was barred by the statute of limitations). 
78. Contois v. W. Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019, 1025 (R.I. 2004). 
79. Madros v. Prescod, 948 A.2d 304, 311 (R.I. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that because the loss-of-
chance doctrine affects only the causation part of the tort analysis and because the jury never was 
required to reach the question of causation, the trial justice’s failure to instruct on the loss-of-chance 
doctrine is moot.”).  
80. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 619, 664 P.2d 474, 479 (1983). 
81. 172 Wash. 2d 844, 857, 262 P.3d 490, 496 (2011). 
82. Id. 
83. See infra Part II.C.1.  
84. See Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 854–56, 262 P.3d at 495 (“To limit Herskovits to cases that result 
in death is arbitrary; the same underlying principles of deterring negligence and compensating for 
injury apply when the ultimate harm is permanent disability.”). 
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failed to address many of the problems the opinion created.85 Mohr was 
almost entirely silent on providing guidance to courts and practitioners 
when dealing with a loss of chance claim.86 Most recently, the 
Washington State Court of Appeals for Division III attempted to tackle 
many of the problems left behind by Mohr in Estate of Dormaier v. 
Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC.87 However, the Dormaier court only 
served to further muddle the doctrine.88 
This Comment will now explore the loss-of-chance doctrine’s 
development in Washington. The discussion includes an overview of 
each pertinent loss of chance case, followed by an explanation of the 
issues remaining or created by each opinion. This Part proceeds 
chronologically, beginning with Herskovits v. Group Health 
Cooperative of Puget Sound,89 and ending with Estate of Dormaier v. 
Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC.90 
A. Herskovits and the Adoption of the Loss-of-Chance Doctrine 
In Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, a medical 
malpractice suit by a plaintiff who died after his physician initially failed 
to diagnose the plaintiff’s lung cancer, the Washington State Supreme 
Court first adopted loss of chance as a matter of common law.91 The 
Court addressed the issue of whether plaintiff-patient Herskovits—who 
had a 39% chance of survival that was reduced to 25%—could maintain 
a cause of action against the hospital and its doctors for the negligence 
that resulted in a 14% decrease in his chance of survival.92 
Decedent Leslie Herskovits began visiting Group Health Hospital in 
early 1974 with lung problems.93 By December of 1974, he had a 
persistent cough and lung pain, but was treated only with cough syrup.94 
85. See infra Part II.C.1.  
86. See infra Part II.C.1. 
87. 177 Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013).  
88. See infra Part II.D.1. 
89. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983). 
90. 177 Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013). 
91. 99 Wash. 2d at 619, 664 P.2d at 479. Herskovits was the first case to adopt loss of chance in 
Washington State; however, Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 293, 545 P.2d 13 (1975), 
held that, under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 323, one who negligently renders aid 
and increases the risk of harm is liable for damages caused. Brown, 86 Wash. 2d at 299, 545 P.2d at 
17–18.   
92. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 611, 664 P.2d at 475.  
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
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In the spring of 1975, he saw a private practice physician, who 
diagnosed him with lung cancer.95 In July 1975, Mr. Herskovits had his 
lung removed. He died twenty months later.96 
Edith Herskovits, widow and personal representative of Leslie 
Herskovits’s estate, brought suit against Group Health Cooperative of 
Puget Sound for failure to timely diagnose her husband’s lung cancer.97 
At the hearing on summary judgment, the plaintiff was unable to show 
that the failure to initially diagnose his lung cancer more probably than 
not caused his death.98 Experts, in affidavits, opined that the delayed 
diagnosis resulted in a 14% reduction in the decedent’s chances of 
survival.99 The Superior Court for King County employed the traditional 
approach and granted summary judgment to the defendant based on the 
plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence that the alleged negligence more 
probably than not caused the death.100 
In a fractured decision, the Washington State Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of whether, under Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 323(a),101 proof that a defendant’s conduct increased the risk of 
death by decreasing the chances of survival was sufficient to take the 
issue of proximate cause to the jury.102 In its lead opinion the Court 
answered yes,103 relying on decisions from other jurisdictions104 that 
allowed cases to go to a jury based on evidence that the defendant’s 
conduct deprived decedents of a “significant” chance to survive or 
recover.105 The cases that the Court relied on did not require proof to a 
95. Id. 
96. Id.  
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 611–12, 664 P.2d at 475–76.  
99. Id. at 612, 664 P.2d at 475. 
100. See id. at 620–21, 664 P.2d at 480 (Pearson, J., concurring) (“The trial court granted the 
motion and dismissed the action, holding that plaintiff had ‘failed to produce expert testimony 
which would establish that the decedent probably would not have died on or about March, 1977 but 
for the conduct of the defendant.’” (emphasis in original)). 
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) (“One who undertakes . . . to render 
services to another . . . is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure 
to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care 
increases the risk of such harm . . . .”). 
102. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 613, 664 P.2d at 476 (lead opinion). 
103. Id. at 614, 664 P.2d at 476–77. 
104. Id. at 625, 664 P.2d at 482 (Pearson, J., concurring) (citing McBride v. United States, 462 
F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972); Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970); Hicks v. United States, 368 
F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel 
Hosp., 357 N.Y.S. 2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)). 
105. Id. at 613–14, 664 P.2d at 476–77 (lead opinion). 
 
                                                     
20 - Wurdeman Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2014  12:23 PM 
2014] LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE 617 
degree of “absolute certainty” that the defendant’s actions caused the 
injury or death.106 
The Court’s reasoning was two-fold.107 First, the Court held it was not 
for the tortfeasor, “who put the possibility of recovery beyond 
realization, to say afterwards that the result was inevitable.”108 Second, 
the Court concluded that not allowing such a claim to go forward would 
in effect be a “blanket release from liability for doctors and hospitals any 
time there was less than a 50 percent chance of survival, regardless of 
how flagrant the negligence.”109 Departing from traditional tort law, 
which requires a “but-for” test for causation,110 the Court determined the 
defendant could still be held liable although the defendant did not cause 
the decedent’s lung cancer to initially manifest, but instead failed in a 
duty to protect against harm from another source.111 With that analysis 
as the starting point, the jury could then consider whether the increased 
risk or decreased chance of recovery was a substantial factor in bringing 
about the harm.112 The plaintiff did not need to present evidence 
sufficient to show that the negligence resulted in the harm, but only that 
it increased the risk of harm.113 It would then be for the jury to bridge the 
gap between increased risk and causation.114 Further, the Herskovits 
Court held: “[n]o matter how small that chance may have been—and its 
magnitude cannot be ascertained—no one can say that the chance of 
prolonging one’s life or decreasing suffering is valueless.”115 Thus, the 
lead opinion adopted the substantial factor approach. 
The Herskovits Court attempted to address candidly the problems 
inherent in the probabilistic nature of its new approach.116 A criticism of 
106. Id. at 614, 664 P.2d 476.  
107. Id. at 614–15, 664 P.2d 476–77. 
108. Id. at 614, 664 P.2d at 476.  
109. Id. at 664 P.2d at 477. 
110. Id. at 616, 664 P.2d 477. 
111. Id.; see also Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1287–88 (Pa. 1978) (“In order than an actor 
is not completely insulated because of uncertainties as to the consequences of his negligent conduct, 
section 323(a) tacitly acknowledges this difficulty and permits the issue to go to the jury upon a less 
than normal threshold of proof.”).  
112. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 617, 664 P.2d at 478. 
113. Id.  
114. Id.; see also Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1288 (“[S]uch evidence furnishes a basis for the fact-finder 
to go further and find that such increased risk was in turn a substantial factor in bringing about the 
resultant harm.”). 
115. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 618, 664 P.2d at 478–79 (emphasis in original) (quoting James v. 
United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1980)).  
116. Id. at 617–18, 664 P.2d at 478. 
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the loss-of-chance doctrine is that it is based on speculation and 
conjecture.117 In response to this critique, the Herskovits court stated that 
“[w]here percentage probabilities and decreased probabilities are 
submitted into evidence, there is simply no danger of speculation on the 
part of the jury. More speculation is involved in requiring the medical 
expert to testify as to what would have happened had the defendant not 
been negligent.”118 
The four-justice concurrence in Herskovits took a different 
approach.119 Of importance was the nature of the injury.120 The 
concurrence determined that if death was the injury, then the standards 
for establishing cause in fact in a medical malpractice case, set forth in 
O’Donoghue v. Riggs,121 were not satisfied.122 The defendant’s 
negligence—causing a 14% reduction as opposed to a 51% or greater 
reduction in chance—did not more probably than not cause the 
decedent’s death.123 If so, the concurrence wrote that the trial court 
decision must be affirmed.124 To do otherwise would be to “depart 
substantially from the traditional requirements of establishing proximate 
cause in this type of case.”125 The concurrence rejected the lead 
opinion’s adoption of the substantial factor approach, because this 
approach did not comport with the traditional elements of causation in 
medical malpractice cases. 
However, if the reduced chance of survival in itself is the injury,126 
117. See Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 604–05 (8th Cir. 1970) (rejecting the argument that the 
jury’s decision involved “speculation and conjecture”); Férot, supra note 1, at 599–600 (stating that 
loss of chance as an injury is often criticized for being a speculative harm). 
118. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 618, 664 P.2d at 478; see also Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 
653 (1946) (“It is no answer to say that the jury’s verdict involved speculation and 
conjecture . . . . [A] measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose 
duty it is to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable 
inference.”); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 31 (1935) (addressing the 
value of a chance).  
119. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 619–36, 664 P.2d at 479–86 (Pearson, J., concurring).  
120. See id. at 623, 664 P.2d at 481.  
121. 73 Wash. 2d 814, 440 P.2d 823 (1968). 
122. Id. at 824, 440 P.2d at 830 (“To remove the issue from the realm of speculation, the medical 
testimony must at least be sufficiently definite to establish that the act complained of ‘probably’ or 
‘more likely than not’ caused the subsequent disability.”). 
123. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 623, 664 P.2d at 481 (Pearson, J., concurring) (“Dr. Ostrow 
was unable to state that probably, or more likely than not, Mr. Herskovits’s death was caused by 
defendant’s negligence.”). 
124. Id.  
125. Id. 
126. Viewing the lost chance as the injury separates the distinction between causation and 
valuation. The question is not “Did the lost chance cause the injury?” but rather, “What is the lost 
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then the O’Donoghue test is met.127 The concurrence relied on the 
approach taken in three cases—Jeanes v. Milner,128 O’Brien v. Stover,129 
and James v. United States.130 In Jeanes, O’Brien, and James, the 
reduction in, or loss of, the chance of survival was the actionable 
injury.131 As such, the defendant was liable only for damages pertaining 
to the diminished or lost chance of survival, not for the death itself.132 
The concurrence also drew on Joseph King’s article, Causation, 
Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting 
Conditions and Future Consequences,133 which advocates for allowing 
recovery for a loss of chance, even if the chance of recovery was less 
than 50%.134 To do otherwise—employing the all-or-nothing approach 
to recovery—would “[subvert] the deterrence objectives of tort law by 
denying recovery for the effects of conduct that causes statistically 
demonstrable losses . . . . A failure to allocate the cost of these losses to 
their tortious sources . . . strikes at the integrity of the torts system of 
loss allocation.”135 This reasoning is at the heart of the proportional 
approach. 
Thus, the concurrence found that the loss of a less-than-even chance 
on its own is an actionable injury.136 The claim may be brought by the 
decedent’s personal representative137 via Washington’s wrongful death 
statute.138 Under such a scheme, a person will “cause” someone’s death 
if he causes a “substantial reduction in that person’s chance of 
chance—the injury—worth?” The all-or-nothing and substantial-factor approaches deal in terms of 
causation, whereas the proportional approach, which the Herskovits concurrence adopted, is a 
theory of valuation. Id. at 634–35, 664 P.2d at 487.  
127. Id. at 624, 664 P.2d at 481.  
128. 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970). 
129. 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971). 
130. 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
131. See Stover, 443 F.2d at 1019 (approving damages for patient’s reduced “chances of 
survival,” or at least “living longer and more comfortably”); Milner, 428 F.2d at 604–05 (finding 
delayed diagnosis of cancer reduced survival rate from 35% to 24%); James, 483 F. Supp. at 587 
(“No matter how small that chance may have been—and its magnitude cannot be ascertained—no 
one can say that the chance of prolonging one’s life or decreasing suffering is valueless.”).  
132. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 632, 664 P.2d at 485–86. 
133. 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981). 
134. Id. at 1363–64. 
135. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 634, 664 P.2d at 486–87 (Pearson, J., concurring) (quoting King, 
supra note 5, at 1377).  
136. Id. 
137. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (2012).  
138. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 634–35, 664 P.2d at 486–87 (Pearson, J., concurring); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (2012).  
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survival.”139 Again citing King’s article, the concurrence found that 
damages for a loss of chance claim would be allocated proportionally, 
and a 14% loss of survival acts as 14% liability for a person’s death.140  
In this case, if Herskovits’s estate was successful on its claim, the estate 
would recover 14% of what it would have recovered had the defendant 
affirmatively caused his death.141 
In sum, the Herskovits lead opinion created relaxed causation 
standards in that the “substantial factor” test pertaining to chance lost 
need not necessarily be 51% or greater to establish proximate 
causation.142 The concurrence adopted the proportional approach, and 
stated that the loss of chance itself is the actionable injury, and 
traditional elements of tort law apply.143 Negligence must be the 
proximate cause of the lost chance, not the ultimate outcome.144 
1. The Lead Opinion’s Adoption of the Substantial Factor Approach 
Rewrites Tort Principles of Causation and Is Subject to 
Manipulation 
The Herskovits majority opinion did not address several issues with 
the loss-of-chance doctrine. As pointed out by the dissenting opinion in 
Herskovits, allowing a less than 51% loss of chance to go to the jury on 
proximate cause upsets traditional notions of tort law.145 Calculation of 
damages is also an issue. The lead opinion states that “[d]amages should 
be awarded to the injured party or his family based only on damages 
caused directly by premature death, such as lost earning and additional 
medical expenses, etc.”146 This language, while intended to soften the 
blow, still promotes overcompensating the plaintiff.147 Based on the 
relaxed causation standards, a defendant would be liable for 100% of 
139. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 634–35, 664 P.2d at 486–87 (Pearson, J., concurring); see also 
id. at 635 n.1, 664 P.2d at 487 n.1 (advocating for a liberal construction of the wrongful death 
statute because the word “cause” has a “notoriously elusive meaning” and is “flexible” enough to fit 
this interpretation). 
140. Id. at 635, 664 P.2d at 487; King, supra note 5, at 1382.  
141. See Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 635, 664 P.2d at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring) (stating that 
recovery would be the percentage lost times the value of the decedent’s life). 
142. Id. at 610–19, 664 P.2d at 474–79 (lead opinion). 
143. Id. at 619–636, 664 P.2d at 479–87 (Pearson, J., concurring). 
144. Id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479. 
145. See id. at 639, 664 P.2d at 489 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting) (“Except in situations where 
there are coequal causes, however, defendant’s act cannot be a substantial factor when the event 
would have occurred without it.”). 
146. Id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479 (lead opinion). 
147. King, supra note 5, at 1368–70. 
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future lost earnings and medical expenses based on a 14% reduction of a 
chance of survival.148 Some scholars believe that the relaxed causation 
standard overcompensates plaintiffs and holds physicians liable for too 
much.149 
Furthermore, the opinion is unclear as to how to calculate the actual 
percentage lost.150 At one point, the court uses 14%, as stipulated by the 
parties, which would be the proportional percentage, based on a 100% 
expectation of survival scale.151 Later on, the court moves to a relative 
proportional percentage,152 stating that a reduction from 39% to 25% is a 
36% loss of chance.153 This poses significant problems both in terms of 
the substantial factor test and in damages. For example, say Patient A has 
a 4% chance of survival, which is reduced to 1%. That is either a 3% 
loss of chance, or a 75% loss of chance, depending on which type of 
proportionality is applied. Patient B had a 60% chance of survival that 
was reduced to 40% because of the defendant’s negligence. The strict 
proportional difference would be 20%, and the relative proportional 
difference would be 33.3%. Under the all-or-nothing approach, and if 
relative proportionality is applied, Patient A might stand to recover the 
full amount of damages when the possibility of dying was 96%, while 
Patient B would get nothing. However, it takes no stretch of the 
imagination to see that Patient B has been more harmed by defendant’s 
negligence. Under the proportional approach, Patient A could recover 
either 3% or 75%,154 and Patient B would recover 20% or 33%. Under 
the substantial factor approach, both Patient A and B are eligible to 
148. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 633, 664 P.2d at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring). 
149. See e.g., King, supra note 25, at 508 (“[By] relaxing the proof requirements, it increases the 
likelihood that a plaintiff will be able to convince a jury to award full damages.”). 
150. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 610, 614, 664 P.2d at 474, 476–77 (lead opinion) (stating a 14% 
reduction at one point and a 36% reduction later on). 
151. Id. at 610, 664 P.2d at 474; King, supra note 5, at 1382. 
152. An easy way to distinguish between strict proportional percentage and relative proportional 
percentage is the type of math involved. Strict proportional percentage uses simple subtraction. 40% 
to 10% is a reduction of 30%. Relative proportional percentage involves a more complicated 
equation. If we are taking a reduction in chance from 40% to 10%, we first subtract 10% from 40%, 
which leaves us with 30%. The equation then becomes, 30 is what percentage of 40? Or 30 = 
40 x / 100. The answer is 75%.  
153. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 614, 664 P.2d at 476–77.  
154. Seventy-five percent recovery is just a theoretical example. As the law in Washington 
stands, once the percentage lost exceeds 50%, the loss-of-chance doctrine morphs from the 
proportional approach to the all-or-nothing approach. See Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, 
177 Wash. App 828, 850, 313 P.3d 431, 441 (2013) (“As a matter of law, a greater than 50 percent 
reduction in the decedent’s chance of survival is the same as proximate cause of the decedent’s 
death under traditional tort principles.”) As will be demonstrated, this morphing is one of the 
complications arising from using loss of chance as an umbrella term. See infra Part II.D.1.  
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recover 100% of damages. However, seeing as how percentages are 
manipulable, using relative proportionality makes the lost chance appear 
more substantial than it actually is. 
2. Solutions, and Problems, of the Concurrence 
The concurrence’s plurality opinion,155 if followed, solves two of the 
lead opinion’s problems.156 By making the loss of chance the actionable 
injury,157 the concurrence solves the problem of distorting traditional tort 
law.158 Furthermore, the concurrence eliminates the all-or-nothing 
approach of the 51% requirement, employs proportional percentages to 
the percentage lost as well as damages, and still adequately leaves 
plaintiffs with an avenue of redress.159 However, by saying that the 
negligence was not the proximate cause of death, but that it “caused” the 
death for purposes of the statute, the concurrence seems to—in theory—
revert to the relaxed causation standard, only via a different route.160 
B. Loss of Chance Between Herskovits and Mohr 
Although unclear following Herskovits, the loss-of-chance doctrine 
remained viable from its adoption in 1983 through 2011, when the 
Washington State Supreme Court again addressed it in Mohr v. 
Grantham.161 In 1990, the Washington State Court of Appeals for 
Division One, in Zueger v. Public Hospital District Number 2,162 held 
that the Herskovits “plurality represents the law on a loss of the chance 
of survival.”163 In 2000, in Shellenbarger v. Brigman164 the Washington 
State Court of Appeals for Division Two held that “Washington 
recognizes loss of chance as a compensable injury.”165 In Shellenbarger, 
155. The concurrence, signed by four Justices as opposed to the two-Justice lead opinion, is the 
plurality opinion. Therefore, “concurrence” and “plurality” are used interchangeably throughout this 
Comment.  
156. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 632–35, 664 P.2d at 485–87 (Pearson, J., concurring).  
157. Id. at 634, 664 P.2d at 487.  
158. Id. (holding that the negligence was a proximate cause, established by expert testimony and 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence, of the lost chance). 
159. Id. at 635, 664 P.2d at 487. 
160. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (2012). 
161. 172 Wash. 2d 844, 262 P.3d 490 (2011). 
162. 57 Wash. App. 584, 789 P.2d 326 (1990). 
163. Id. at 591, 789 P.2d at 329.  
164. 101 Wash. App. 339, 3 P.3d 211 (2000).  
165. Id. at 348, 3 P.3d at 216. 
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the court addressed a 20% reduction in slowing the progression of 
decedent’s lung disease initially caused by asbestos.166 The court found 
that it was no different from Herskovits’s lost chance of survival.167 The 
slight deviation from Herskovits—the loss of chance was only to slow 
the disease, not a 20% loss of chance of recovery—may have signaled 
the beginnings of the expansion found in Mohr.168 The 2000 version of 
Washington Practice appeared to endorse the lead opinion of Herskovits: 
“Another exception to the cause in fact requirement is available when 
the plaintiff more probably than not would have suffered the injury 
complained of, but the defendant’s negligence deprived him of a chance 
to avoid the injury.”169 
C. Mohr and the Expansion of the Loss-of-Chance Doctrine 
In 2011, the Washington State Supreme Court revisited the loss-of-
chance doctrine in Mohr v. Grantham.170 This opinion seemed to cure 
some of the defects left by Herskovits and expanded the loss-of-chance 
doctrine to include the loss of chance of a better outcome not resulting in 
death.171 The plaintiff, Mrs. Mohr, alleged that negligent care led to a 
delayed diagnosis of a dissected carotid artery that resulted in permanent 
brain damage.172 Mrs. Mohr and her husband filed suit, claiming the 
doctors’ negligence in failing to diagnose and treat her dissected carotid 
artery “substantially diminished her chance of recovery.”173 Plaintiff’s 
expert testified that Mrs. Mohr’s treatment violated the standard of care, 
and had she received non-negligent treatment, would have had a 50% to 
60% chance at a better outcome.174 
Hesitant to expand Herskovits, the Benton County Superior Court 
granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Mohrs did 
not show but-for causation.175 On appeal, the Washington State Supreme 
166. Id. at 345, 3 P.3d at 214. 
167. Id. at 349, 3 P.3d at 216. 
168. Id.  
169. 16 DAVID K. DEWOLF & KELLER W. ALLEN, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: TORT LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 4.10, at 110 (2d ed. 2000). 
170. 172 Wash. 2d 844, 262 P.3d 490 (2011). 
171. See id. at 857, 262 P.3d at 498 (officially adopting the Herskovits concurrence and extending 
it to include the loss of a chance of a better outcome short of death). 
172. Id. at 847–49, 262 P.3d at 491–92. 
173. Id. at 849, 262 P.3d at 492. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 849–50, 262 P.3d at 492–93. 
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Court formally adopted the reasoning of the Herskovits concurrence176 
and extended the loss-of-chance doctrine to cases in which the end result 
is something short of death.177 Loss of chance of survival was expanded 
to loss of chance of a better outcome.178 
The Court reasoned that “[t]o limit Herskovits to cases that result in 
death is arbitrary.”179 Building on Shellenbarger v. Brigman,180 which 
recognized the “loss of chance as a compensable interest,”181 the Court 
noted that the expansion fits within Washington’s statue for medical 
malpractice.182 However, the Court’s reasoning was that “nothing in the 
medical malpractice statute precludes a lost chance cause of action,” and 
that the chapter did not define “proximate cause” and “injury.”183 
With the loss of chance as the actionable injury, the Mohr formulation 
requires a plaintiff to prove duty, breach, and that the breach 
proximately caused—not the ultimate outcome184—but the loss of 
chance.185 In addressing the concern surrounding assessment of 
damages, the Court relied on reasoning from a similar loss of chance 
case from Massachusetts—Matsuyama v. Birnbaum.186 The Matsuyama 
court concluded that “[s]uch difficulties are not confined to loss of 
chance claims. A wide range of medical malpractice cases, as well as 
numerous other tort actions, are complex and involve actuarial or other 
probabilistic estimates.”187 Estimates are nothing new as judges and 
juries often must decide what the value of a better outcome would be.188 
The Mohr court also adopted the Herskovits concurrence’s method of 
176. Id. at 857, 262 P.3d at 496. 
177. Id. at 855–56, 262 P.3d at 495–96. 
178. Id. at 850–57, 262 P.3d at 493–96. 
179. Id. at 856, 262 P.3d at 495. 
180. 101 Wash. App. 339, 3 P.3d 211 (2000). 
181. Id. at 348, 3 P.3d at 216. 
182. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 856, 262 P.3d at 496; WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (2012). 
183. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 856, 262 P.3d at 496; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.70.020, 7.70.040. 
184. The “ultimate outcome” refers to the end result, not the lost chance. For example, if a 
patient’s chance of surviving a type of cancer is reduced from 40% to 20%, and the patient dies, the 
ultimate outcome is death. However the actionable injury would be the lost chance, not the death. 
See, e.g., Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 857, 262 P.3d at 496 (distinguishing between the lost chance as the 
compensable injury and the ultimate outcome). 
185. Id. 
186. 890 N.E. 2d 819 (Mass. 2008). 
187. Id. at 833. 
188. See, e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929) (holding that the court had to 
determine the value of a 100% perfect hand). 
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calculating damages—the proportional damages approach.189 This 
damages calculation technique alleviated the Herskovits lead opinion’s 
potential problem of whether to apply relative or proportional 
percentages.190 
Finally, Mohr held true to the principal rationale of Herskovits—that 
to not recognize a loss of chance would be a blanket release of liability 
for anyone who had less than a 51% chance of survival or avoiding 
injury or disability, no matter how egregious the negligence.191 
The Mohr opinion solved some of the problems left behind by 
Herskovits. First, in rejecting the Herskovits lead opinion, the holding in 
Mohr clarifies that Washington is not adopting a relaxed theory of 
causation.192 By explicitly holding that the loss of chance is the 
actionable injury, although it in effect created a new class of plaintiffs, 
the Court brought the loss-of-chance doctrine back into the traditional 
confines of tort law, which require a plaintiff to prove that a defendant 
more likely than not caused her injury.193 Now, the negligence must be 
the “but-for” and proximate cause of the patient’s lost chance of a better 
outcome, not the ultimate outcome itself.194 Second, the damages 
scheme is fairer to medical practitioners than the Herskovits lead 
opinion’s damages calculation method because the Court adopted the 
concurrence and rejected the relaxation of the “substantial factor” test.195 
Under the lead opinion of Herskovits, it is possible that a defendant 
could be liable for 100% of damages for causing 14% of the harm.196 By 
adopting the proportional damages approach, the court curbed the 
possibility of overcompensating plaintiffs while ensuring that 
legitimately aggrieved plaintiffs get their day in court. 
1. Uncertainty After Mohr: The Problems of Expanding a Doctrine 
Without Providing Guidance on Its Application in Practice 
While Mohr solved one problem of Herskovits, it resolved little of the 
uncertainty regarding this doctrine. In fact, the Mohr decision presented 
189. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 858–59, 262 P.3d at 496–97. 
190. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 610–19, 664 P.2d 474, 
474–79 (1983). 
191. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 855–58, 262 P.3d at 495–97. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 858–59, 262 P.3d at 496–97. 
196. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 610–19, 664 P.2d 474, 
474–79 (1983). 
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more questions than answers. All the Mohr court effectively held was 
the adoption of the Herskovits concurrence and the extension of loss of 
chance to include loss of chance of a better outcome. The problems 
implicated by the decision, yet left unaddressed, are principally what this 
Comment attempts to resolve. 
a. When Is the Loss of Chance Argument Appropriate? 
The plaintiffs in Mohr argued a loss of a 50% to 60% chance at a 
better outcome.197 The Mohr opinion’s main focus was on whether or 
not to extend the doctrine to include the loss of a chance of a better 
outcome,198 but did not address the fact that, under the Herskovits 
concurrence, which the Mohr court officially adopted, a loss of chance 
over 51% qualifies as proximate causation.199 Can one have a greater 
than 51% loss of chance that does not qualify as proximate cause of the 
end result? The Court was silent on this matter. 
Furthermore, what must the starting percentage be? If an analysis 
starts at 50% or less, the lost chance will always be less than 51%. But 
what if the starting percentage is 85% and the ending percentage is 60%, 
a 25% loss of chance? The patient had a better than even chance of a 
good outcome pre- and post- negligence, but the lost chance was less 
than 50%. And what if the patient, pre-negligence, had a 60% chance of 
survival, and post-negligence had a 40% chance of survival? The 
plaintiff has gone from more likely than not going to survive, to more 
likely than not going to die. The evidence presented in Mohr was for a 
50% to 60% lost chance,200 but the opinion did not explain whether 50% 
to 60% was the starting percentage, or whether 50% to 60% was the total 
percentage lost and the starting percentage is irrelevant because the 50% 
threshold of lost chance is met. In short, Mohr gives no guidance as to 
whether—in order to claim a loss of chance—the starting percentage 
must be 50% or less, or the total chance lost must be 50% or less. 
b. What Evidence Is Necessary to Satisfy the Burden of Proof? 
The Mohr court provides little guidance about the evidentiary 
standards necessary to satisfy the burden of proof for a loss of chance 
claim. The Court states that “[t]o prove causation, a plaintiff would then 
197. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 849, 262 P.3d at 492. 
198. Id. at 850, 262 P.3d at 493.  
199. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 631, 664 P.2d at 485 (Pearson, J., concurring). 
200. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 860, 262 P.3d at 497. 
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rely on established tort causation doctrines permitted by law and the 
specific evidence of the case.”201 We are told that “calculation of a loss 
of chance . . . is based on expert testimony, which in turn is based on 
significant practical experience and ‘on data obtained and analyzed 
scientifically . . . as part of the repertoire of diagnosis and treatment, as 
applied to the specific facts of the plaintiff’s case.’”202 However, what 
the ‘specific facts’ are remains unclear. In a given loss of chance case, 
the establishing causation may be a two-step process. For example, 
assume a patient is misdiagnosed with cancer. At the time of the 
misdiagnosis, it is alleged the patient was at stage I and had a 40% 
chance of survival. Two years later, the patient is diagnosed with stage 
III cancer and the patient’s chance of survival is 10%. In order to prove 
causation of the lost chance, must the experts testify only to the chances 
of survival at each stage of cancer? Or must the experts also 
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the patient was in 
fact at stage I when the misdiagnosis occurred?203 
c. Must the Ultimate Outcome Occur? 
In both Herskovits and Mohr, the ultimate outcomes transpired.204 
This makes the lost chance relevant, and provides a basis for calculating 
damages—the ultimate outcome. But if the injury is the lost chance, and 
not the ultimate outcome, what happens in cases when a plaintiff loses a 
significant chance at a better outcome, yet the outcome does not or has 
not yet come to pass? Is the claim still actionable? How would damages 
be calculated? How does the doctrine anticipate and account for possible 
future harm that may never come to pass? These questions were left 
unraised and unanswered by the Court. 
d. Do Mohr and Herskovits Govern Different Types of Loss of 
Chance Cases? 
Mohr adopted the Herskovits concurrence,205 but does that mean 
201. Id. at 862, 262 P.3d at 499. 
202. Id. at 857–58, 262 P.3d at 496 (quoting Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 833 
(Mass. 2008)). 
203. See e.g., Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 2013) (finding that the expert 
concluded cancer had not metastasized at time of misdiagnosis, but was at Stage III or IV when 
finally diagnosed).  
204. See Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 849, 262 P.3d at 492 (plaintiff permanently brain damaged); 
Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 611, 664 P.2d at 475 (plaintiff died). 
205. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 857, 262 P.3d at 496. 
 
                                                     
20 - Wurdeman Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2014  12:23 PM 
628 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:603 
Mohr now governs loss of chance cases in which the end result is death? 
Is Herskovits still good law? And if so, does Mohr dictate that the 
Herskovits concurrence applies to wrongful death cases, and Mohr to 
loss of chance of a better outcome cases? While it may intuitively seem 
that Mohr applies to all loss of chance cases, it is not clear. Mohr was 
cabined in the medical malpractice statute,206 and Herskovits in the 
wrongful death statute.207 How are these to be reconciled? This 
confusion is highlighted in the Dormaier opinion, discussed in Part II.D. 
e. When Must Loss of Chance Be Pleaded? 
Must loss of chance be pleaded in the initial complaint? Or is it 
enough for a plaintiff to present evidence of a lost chance to receive the 
jury instruction? If a defendant presents expert testimony to the effect 
that the lost chance was a very small percentage, as an affirmative 
defense, has it just argued itself into a lost chance jury instruction for the 
plaintiff? 
f. Is Loss of Chance Statutory? 
As addressed by the Mohr dissent, the loss of chance of a better 
outcome does not conform to the medical malpractice statute.208 Forcing 
it into the statute—even though “injury,” as used in the statute, can be 
used to mean the loss of a chance—runs the risk of confusing the lost 
chance with proximate causation for the ultimate outcome. It does not 
belong in the statute, just as Justice Pearson’s notion of “causation” did 
not bring loss of chance into the wrongful death statute.209 It is, in 
essence, rewriting the statute, and creating a potential source of 
confusion. 
206. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (2012) (providing that a plaintiff must establish breach and 
causation) (“(1) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning 
expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider . . . ; and (2) Such failure was a proximate 
cause of the injury complained of”). 
207. Id. § 4.20.010 (“When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or 
default of another his or her personal representative may maintain an action for damages against the 
person causing the death . . . .”). 
208. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 868, 262 P.3d at 501 (Madsen, J., dissenting) (“[T]he legislature 
meant an actual physical disability resulting from the failure to exercise proper care, not an 
amorphous ‘lost chance’ that may well involve no actual disability at all.”); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 7.70.040. 
209. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 634–35, 664 P.2d 486–
87 (1983) (Pearson, J., concurring). 
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g. What Is the Conjunction Principle and When Should It Be Used? 
The Mohr opinion mentions the conjunction principle210 in a citation 
parenthetical, as a way to mitigate percentage lost in the face of 
uncertainty.211 Specifically the Court states that “[w]here appropriate, 
[the lost chance percentage] may otherwise be discounted for margins of 
error to further reflect the uncertainty of outcome even with a 
nonnegligent standard of care.”212 However the Court does not define 
the conjunction principle, or provide guidance as to when it would be 
appropriate to apply it. 
D. Estate of Dormaier and Its Application of Mohr and Herskovits 
The most recent case to tackle the loss-of-chance doctrine was Estate 
of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC.213 This Washington 
State Court of Appeals case concerned a patient who had died from a 
pulmonary embolism that detached from her hip during surgery.214 The 
complaint alleged that Mrs. Dormaier “died as a proximate result of the 
negligence of the Defendants” and “sustained injuries and damages and 
died due to the negligence of Defendants.”215 At trial, Plaintiff presented 
expert witnesses who testified that, had the pulmonary embolus been 
detected, the patient would have had a 90% chance of surviving.216 The 
experts stated that the misdiagnoses reduced Mrs. Dormaier’s chances of 
survival by 50% to 90%.217 At the close of trial, the plaintiffs requested a 
jury instruction on the decedent’s lost chance of survival, which the trial 
court granted because both sides had addressed loss of chance in their 
210. The conjunction principle takes into account possible or known discrepancies in percentage. 
Depending on the facts, it can be used by either plaintiff or defendant. For example, if the lost 
chance is 30%, and the probability that the plaintiff was at the proposed starting percentage was 
80%, the total lost chance would be 30% times 80%, or 24%. In that instance, the defendant is using 
the conjunction principle to mitigate the proportional damages. However, if the total lost chance 
was 50%, and the probability that the plaintiff was at the proposed starting percentage was 40% 
(thus not meeting the preponderance of the evidence standard to show causation for the lost chance). 
The conjunction principle could be applied to circumvent proximate cause, i.e., 50% times 40% 
equals a 20% total lost chance, even though the burden of proving causation has not been met. The 
conjunction principle, in some ways, can be seen as a sort of proportional approach twice applied. 
See King, supra note 25, at 554–56 (explaining the conjunction principle). 
211. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 858, 262 P.3d at 497.  
212. Id. (citing King, supra note 25, at 554–56). 
213. 177 Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013). 
214. Id. at 836–38, 313 P.3d at 434–35. 
215. Id. at 838, 313 P.3d at 435.  
216. Id. at 839, 313 P.3d at 435–36. 
217. Id.  
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cases.218 In a special verdict, the jury returned the following responses: 
(1) the defendant was negligent; (2) the defendant’s negligence was not 
the proximate cause of Mrs. Dormaier’s death; (3) the defendant’s 
negligence was a proximate cause of Mrs. Dormaier’s lost chance of 
survival; and (4) the percentage lost was 70%.219 Defendants sought a 
directed verdict based on the inconsistency between answers two and 
four.220 In other words, because Mohr and the Herskovits concurrence 
made loss of chance a separate and distinct injury, the defendants 
contended that the plaintiffs should not be able to argue a 50% loss of 
chance to get the jury instruction for loss of chance, and then use it to 
circumvent proximate cause for the ultimate outcome. The trial court 
concluded that the two entries were not irreconcilable, because “[i]t 
was . . . not inconsistent with the jury’s rejection of negligence as a 
proximate cause of the death itself, for the jury to consider the 
percentage by which negligence diminished Mrs. Dormaier’s chance to 
survive the death-causing event.”221 Defendants also asked that the 
award be limited to 70% of the damages because the jury did not find 
proximate cause of the death, but only the 70% loss of chance.222 The 
trial court refused, concluding 
[h]ad the jury found that the diminution of chance to survive 
was less than 50%, then the court would have been required to 
reduce the jury’s finding of damages by that figure. However, 
where the reduction in chance to survive is itself found to be 
greater than 50%, it becomes, as a matter of law, a concurrent 
proximate cause of the death . . . .223 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered: 1) whether a plaintiff 
may argue the lost chance doctrine if the chance lost was greater than 
50%; (2) whether plaintiffs must plead loss of chance as a separate cause 
of action; (3) whether the special verdict answers were irreconcilable; 
and (4) whether damages should be reduced to 70% of the total award.224 
As to the first issue, the court looked back at Herskovits and Mohr, 
and concluded “a plaintiff may not argue the lost chance doctrine where 
the defendant’s negligence reduced the decedent’s chance of survival by 
218. Id. at 840–41, 313 P.3d at 436.  
219. Id. at 841–42, 313 P.3d at 437. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 843, 313 P.3d at 437. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 843–44, 313 P.3d at 437–38. 
224. Id. at 844–70, 313 P.3d at 438–51.  
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greater than 50 percent.”225 Because the lost chance presented was 50% 
to 90%—with 50% being the threshold percentage—arguing loss of 
chance was appropriate.226 
On the second issue, appellants argued that not pleading lost chance 
of survival as a separate cause of action was inconsistent with Mohr and 
violated Superior Court Civil Rule 8,227 which states, in part, “[a] 
pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”228 The court disagreed, citing Herskovits’s recognizing loss of 
chance as an “actionable injury” and that “a person will ‘cause’ the death 
of another person (within the meaning of Revised Code of Washington 
4.20.010) whenever he causes a substantial reduction in that person’s 
chance of survival.”229 The court then went on to say “the Mohr court 
reaffirmed a lost chance of survival is fundamentally an alternative 
manner of proving wrongful death causation, available solely where the 
defendant’s negligence reduced the decedent’s chance of survival by less 
than or equal to 50 percent.”230 Because the Mohr Court did not decide 
how to classify a loss of chance for Civil Rule 8 pleading purposes, the 
Dormaier court concluded that it was not intended that loss of chance be 
considered a separate cause of action.231 Because wrongful death was the 
theory upon which the plaintiff’s sought relief, whether or not the 
complaint pleaded the lost chance was irrelevant.232 
The third issue deals with the fact that the jury, on question four, 
answered that defendant’s negligence caused a 70% loss of chance of 
survival.233 Yet, for question two, the jury answered that defendant’s 
negligence was not a proximate cause of her death.234 The lost chance 
instruction read, “[i]f you find that the loss or diminution of a chance to 
survive was in excess of 50%, then you have found that such negligence 
was a proximate cause of the death.”235 The court reasoned that the two 
225. Id. at 851, 313 P.3d at 441. 
226. Id.  
227. Id. at 853–57, 313 P.3d at 442–44; WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 8 (2013). 
228. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 853–55, 313 P.3d at 442–43. The Court went on state that 
“[w]e construe a complaint liberally so as to do substantial justice.” Id. at 866, 313 P.3d at 449.  
229. Id. at 854–55, 313 P.3d at 440 (quoting Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 
Wash. 2d 609, 634–35, 664 P.2d 487 (1983) (Pearson, J., concurring)). 
230. Id. at 854, 313 P.3d at 443. 
231. Id.  
232. Id. at 856–57, 313 P.3d at 444. 
233. Id. at 867, 313 P.3d at 449. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
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answers could be harmonized because “a lost chance of survival is an 
actionable injury distinct from death . . . the jury could generally find 
proximate cause of the former without finding proximate cause of the 
latter.”236 In light of the jury instruction, the court held that “writing 
‘70%’ in answer 4 had the same legal effect as writing ‘Yes’ in answer 
2.”237 
In analyzing the fourth issue, whether the damages award should be 
reduced to 70%, the court’s reasoning was two-fold.238 First, the court 
referred to its analysis regarding the inconsistent jury verdict, holding 
that the special verdict had the same legal effect as if the jury decided 
the negligence was the proximate cause of decedent’s death.239 Second, 
the court cited the Herskovits Court’s reasoning for adopting loss of 
chance—that it did not want “a blanket release from liability for doctors 
and hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent chance of 
survival, regardless of how flagrant the negligence”240—and decided that 
the “rationale is [not] furthered by reducing recovery where the 
defendant’s negligence proximately caused the decedent’s death.”241 
1. The Dormaier Opinion Exemplifies the Doctrinal Incoherence that 
Plagues the Loss-of-Chance Doctrine 
The Dormaier decision is an excellent example of the doctrinal 
incoherence that accompanies loss of chance. While the Dormaier 
decision points out many of the problems inherent in the loss-of-chance 
doctrine,242 it does little in the way of solving them, and possibly further 
complicates the doctrine. The main issue is that throughout the opinion, 
three different approaches to the loss-of-chance doctrine are employed—
the substantial factor approach,243 the proportional approach,244 and the 
all-or-nothing approach.245 There is a tendency for the court to confuse 
causation principles with valuation principles. This begins with a 
236. Id.  
237. Id. at 868, 313 P.3d at 449–50. 
238. Id. at 868–70, 313 P.3d at 450–51.  
239. Id. at 868–69, 313 P.3d at 450. 
240. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 614, 664 P.2d 474, 477 
(1983). 
241. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 870, 313 P.3d at 451. 
242. See id. at 843–44, 313 P.3d 437–38 (identifying appellants’ arguments that were based on 
uncertainty in the doctrine). 
243. See supra Part I.A.1.  
244. See supra Part I.A.2. 
245. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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misinterpretation of the Herskovits concurrence, and culminates in 
inconsistent application of Herskovits and Mohr. 
The first problem is the misinterpretation of Herskovits. The court in 
Dormaier states that “[b]y reconceptualizing the decedent’s injury as a 
reduction in his chance to survive his death-causing condition, the 
plurality concluded the plaintiff could now prove wrongful death 
causation in the form of a reduced chance of survival by a ‘probably’ or 
‘more likely than not’ standard.”246 It then went on to conclude that 
the Herskovits plurality and Mohr court intended the lost chance 
doctrine to reconceptualize the decedent’s injury and aid the 
plaintiff in proving wrongful death causation solely where the 
plaintiff cannot do so under traditional tort principles, that is, 
where the defendant’s negligence reduced the decedent’s chance 
of survival by less than or equal to 50 percent.247 
This is incorrect. The lost chance is the injury itself; it is not a way to 
prove causation.248 This misconception is understandable, given that the 
Herskovits concurrence stated in one brief paragraph that the loss of 
chance injury may be brought under Washington’s wrongful death 
statute.249 Yet the Dormaier court interprets this principle in a way that 
makes it identical in all but name to the “substantial factor” approach of 
the Herskovits lead opinion.250 As noted earlier in this Comment,251 one 
of the shortfalls of the Herskovits’s concurrence was that it tried to force 
the loss of chance injury into the wrongful death statute. This is an 
accurate representation of why forcing the lost chance into the wrongful 
death statute is problematic.  
The Dormaier court’s interpretation is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, reading it as the Dormaier court does, the Herskovits’s 
concurrence is no different than the lead opinion, in that both would 
246. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 849, 313 P.3d at 440 (quoting Herskovits v. Grp. Health 
Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 632–34, 664 P.2d 485–86 (1983)). 
247. Id. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441. 
248. Compare Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 624, 664 P.2d at 481 (Pearson, J., concurring) (“[I]f we 
perceive the death of Mr. Herskovits as the injury in this case, we must affirm the trial court . . . . If, 
on the other hand, we view the injury to be the reduction of Mr. Herskovits’s chance of survival, our 
analysis might well be different.”), with id. at 634, 664 P.2d at 487 (“[T]he best resolution of the 
issue before us is to recognize the loss of a less than even chance as an actionable injury.”), and 
Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 859, 262 P.3d at 497 (“[W]e hold that . . . the injury is the lost chance.”). 
249. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 634–35, 664 P.2d at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring) (“I would 
interpret the wrongful death statute, RCW 4.20.010, to apply to cases of this type. Under this 
interpretation, a person will ‘cause’ the death of another person (within the meaning of RCW 
4.20.010) whenever he causes a substantial reduction in that person’s chance of survival.”). 
250. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 849, 313 P.3d at 440. 
251. See supra Part II.A.1.  
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employ the “substantial factor” approach to prove causation, even if the 
lost chance is less than even. As pointed out in Mohr, the Herskovits 
court was “divided by different reasoning”252 and “the lead and plurality 
opinions split over how, not whether, to recognize a cause of action.”253 
Second, interpreting the concurrence in this way makes its adoption of 
proportional damages moot. Employing the “substantial factor” 
approach, as the lead opinion does, results in full damages regardless of 
the percentage of chance lost, provided the jury concluded the lost 
chance was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.254 The 
Herskovits concurrence adopted the “proportional” approach, and the 
lead opinion advocated for the “substantial factor” approach. The two 
are not reconcilable.255 
This misinterpretation explains why the Dormaier court classified the 
loss-of-chance doctrine under three separate approaches. This highlights 
the problem with the loss-of-chance doctrine perfectly: it can mean three 
different things depending on how it is applied to a certain set of facts.256 
The next potential issue raised by Dormaier is when the loss of 
chance argument may be made.257 Accurately noting that the Mohr court 
did not specify “whether the plaintiff could argue the lost chance 
doctrine upon the 51 to 60 percent figures as well as the 50 percent 
figure,”258 the court went on to hold that “a plaintiff may not argue the 
lost chance doctrine where the defendant’s negligence reduced the 
decedent’s chance of survival by greater than 50 percent.”259 Important 
252. Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 851, 262 P.3d at 493. 
253. Id. at 852, 262 P.3d at 494.  
254. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 619, 664 P.2d at 479 (lead opinion). 
255. Compare id. (“[R]eduction of chance of survival from 39 percent to 25 percent is sufficient 
evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the jury.”), with id. at 634, 664 P.2d at 487 
(Pearson, J., concurring) (“The family of the decedent should also be allowed to maintain an action 
for the lost chance of recovery by the decedent.”). 
256. See Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 851, 313 P.3d at 441(highlighting the substantial factor 
approach) (“We conclude the Herskovits plurality and Mohr court intended the lost chance doctrine 
to reconceptualize the decedent’s injury and aid the plaintiff in proving wrongful death causation 
solely where the plaintiff cannot do so under traditional tort principles . . . .”); id. at 851, 313 P.3d at 
441 (highlighting the proportional approach) (“[W]here the defendant’s negligence reduced the 
decedent’s chance of survival by less than or equal to 50 percent, the loss of a chance is the injury 
and the plaintiff receives proportional compensation under the lost chance doctrine . . . .”); id. 
(highlighting the all-or-nothing approach) (“[W]here the defendant’s negligence reduced the 
decedent’s chance of survival by greater than 50 percent, as a matter of law, the death remains the 
injury and the plaintiff receives all-or-nothing recovery under traditional tort principles.”). 
257. Id. at 844–45, 313 P.3d at 438. 
258. Id. at 849–50, 313 P.3d at 441. 
259. Id. at 851, 313 P.3d at 441. 
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to that determination was the fact that once the lost chance is greater 
than 50%, death, or the adverse outcome is the injury as a matter of 
law.260 On its face, the Dormaier opinion appears to advocate for 
applying the “proportional approach” when the lost chance is 50% or 
less, and the “all-or-nothing approach” when the lost chance is greater 
than 50%.261 This seems simple enough, however, that the court uses the 
term “loss of chance” to represent two distinct injuries. One injury is the 
lost chance, the other injury is the ultimate outcome. The two injuries are 
separate and distinct. 
The holding in Dormaier seems to create an incentive for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to elicit expert testimony in which the lower threshold of the 
lost chance always includes 50%. An analysis of how Dormaier played 
out at the trial level reveals this clear incentive. In Dormaier, loss of 
chance was not included in the pleadings,262 however the jury instruction 
on loss of chance was allowed because the plaintiff argued a loss of 
chance from 50% to 90%.263 According to the holding, however, the 
plaintiff would not have been able to request a loss of chance jury 
instruction had the 50% or less threshold not been met.264 Yet, based on 
the special verdict responses, the lost chance instruction is what 
eventually enabled the trial court to award full damages to the plaintiff 
even though the jury decided that the defendant’s negligence was not the 
proximate cause of Mrs. Dormaier’s death.265 It is possible, therefore, 
that had the plaintiff not argued a 50% loss of chance, and thus not been 
given the lost chance jury instruction, the plaintiff would have lost the 
case. The jury concluded that there was a 70% loss of chance, but not 
proximate cause for the death, and the court imputed proximate cause 
based on the percentage of lost chance.266 The appellate court approved 
the “all-or-nothing” approach to the lost chance even after arguing that 
lost chance may only be argued when the chance lost is less than 50%.267 
In addition, this reasoning creates an untenable position for the 
defense. The court allowed the loss of chance jury instruction because 
there was testimony to the effect that the lost chance could have been 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 853, 313 P.3d at 442. 
263. Id. at 849–57, 313 P.3d at 441–44. 
264. Id. at 849–50, 313 P.3d at 441. 
265. Id. at 868–70, 313 P.3d at 450–51. 
266. Id.  
267. Id. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441. 
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50%.268 By this rationale, a defendant would open herself up to a new 
cause of action and distinct injury if the defendant argued that plaintiff 
only lost a chance of 50% or less. The plaintiff might be arguing for 
proximate cause of the ultimate outcome, but now loss of chance will be 
allowed to come into the equation based on an affirmative defense. 
Of course it is easy to say that a lost chance under 50% requires the 
proportional approach, and a lost chance over 50% requires the all-or-
nothing approach. But then there is one distinct injury morphing into a 
second separate and distinct injury. And when a plaintiff’s attorney 
argues a lost chance of 50% to 90%, the judge, jury, and opposing 
counsel must juggle two distinct theories of recovery under the same 
name. This confusion demonstrates the need for clarification 
surrounding the loss-of-chance doctrine. 
Finally, the Dormaier court, depending on which issue it is 
addressing, uses conflicting reasoning. For example, in reconciling the 
jury’s verdict, the court found that “[b]ecause a lost chance of survival is 
an actionable injury distinct from death, the jury could generally find 
proximate cause of the former without finding proximate cause of the 
latter.”269 The court is saying that a jury can find proximate cause of a 
70% loss of chance, but not proximate cause of the ultimate outcome. 
Yet it also stated that “[l]ogic compels our conclusion because where the 
loss is greater than 50 percent, no ‘separate and distinguishable harm’ 
exists.”270 Furthermore, in reasoning why lost chance need not be 
pleaded, the court held “[n]othing suggests the Mohr court intended to 
set the loss of a chance apart as an autonomous cause of action, claim, or 
ground for relief,” and “wrongful death remained the legal theory upon 
which respondents sought relief. Thus it is immaterial whether the 
complaint expressly named the lost chance injury.”271 
In its reasoning for approving the lost chance instruction, the court 
held that when the defendant’s negligence reduced the decedent’s 
chance of survival by more than 50%, death remains the injury and the 
plaintiff receives all-or-nothing recovery under tort principles.272 So is 
the court then saying a jury may find proximate cause for the lost 
chance—but not the death or ultimate outcome—and if it finds 
268. Id. 
269. Id. at 867, 313 P.3d at 449 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the court, by reconciling the 
verdict, effectively imputed on the jury a finding of both. Id. 
270. Id. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441 (emphasis added) (quoting Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash. 2d 254, 
261, 704 P.2d 600, 605 (1985)). 
271. Id. at 855–56, 313 P.3d at 443–44 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
272. Id. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441. 
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proximate cause for the lost chance over 50%, the court will impute 
proximate causation for the ultimate outcome? This shifts loss of chance 
from a theory of valuation to a theory of causation, and the separating 
line is difficult to distinguish. 
IV. SOLUTIONS TO CLARIFY THE LOSS-OF-CHANCE 
DOCTRINE IN WASHINGTON 
As has been demonstrated, in Washington loss of chance is an 
umbrella term that papers over a doctrinal incoherence. It is possible, 
and even necessary, that the issue will return to the state Supreme Court. 
If and when it does, this Comment proposes the following clarifications 
that will both make loss of chance easier for juries, practitioners, and 
judges to understand and apply, and will be equitable to both plaintiffs 
and defendants alike. Because the Washington State Supreme Court has 
made it clear that the loss of chance is the actionable injury, distinct 
from the ultimate outcome,273 adopting the proportional approach 
regardless of the percentage is appropriate. Furthermore, this Comment’s 
suggestions on evidentiary admissibility and pleading requirements 
comport with current Washington law. 
A. The Court Should Exclusively Adopt the Proportional Approach, 
Regardless of the Percentage Lost 
Currently in Washington, the loss-of-chance doctrine is used to 
represent the proportional approach for lost chances of 50% or fewer,274 
and it is used to represent the all-or-nothing approach for lost chances of 
51% or higher.275 The Dormaier decision is an excellent example of this. 
The problem is that the court is asking the jurors to keep straight in their 
heads two distinct theories of lost chance, but the court labels them 
under the same title. The two theories require the application and 
evaluation of two distinct proximate causes. For the proportional 
approach, proximate cause must be established as to the lost chance.276 
For the all-or-nothing approach, proximate cause must be shown for the 
273. See Mohr v. Grantham, 172 Wash. 2d 844, 857, 262 P.3d 490, 498 (2011) (“[T]he loss of 
chance is the compensable injury.”). 
274. See Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441 (concluding that Herskovits and 
Mohr intended loss of chance to be argued only when the lost chance was 50% or less). 
275. See id. (finding that the reduction of a greater than 50% chance of recovery constitutes 
proximate cause for the injury itself).  
276. See Mohr, 172 Wash. 2d at 857, 262 P.3d at 496 (holding that plaintiff must show breach of 
duty proximately caused the lost chance of a better outcome).  
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ultimate outcome.277 For example, if the plaintiff argues a lost chance of 
50%–90%, the jury is considering proximate cause for the lost chance of 
50% and the injury is the lost chance. But at 51%, the injury morphs 
from the lost chance to the ultimate outcome, and the proximate cause 
shifts from the lost chance to the ultimate outcome even though it is still 
labeled a lost chance. This is difficult at times for judges and 
practitioners to keep straight, let alone jurors with no legal education. 
Loss of chance should adhere to a single approach. The havoc of 
utilizing three, or even two, of the approaches was made clear in the 
Dormaier decision.278 The Supreme Court must decide whether loss of 
chance should be brought under the “substantial factor,” “proportional,” 
or “all-or-nothing” approach, and only that approach.  
This Comment advocates for the “proportional” approach. This author 
remains persuaded by the Herskovits Court’s reasoning: “To decide 
otherwise would be a blanket release from liability for doctors and 
hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent chance of survival, 
regardless of how flagrant the negligence.”279 However, this Comment 
advocates for a proportional approach that encompasses any lost chance, 
where the lost chance—whatever the percentage—is the injury, and 
damages can be calculated proportionally. The Dormaier court admitted 
this approach is logical, yet left the task to the Supreme Court or 
legislature.280 
As the jury in Dormaier demonstrated, it is possible to find that a 
doctor’s negligence may reduce a patient’s chances of a better outcome 
by greater than 50%, but still not be the cause in fact of the ultimate 
outcome.281 It is important to distinguish the lost chance and the ultimate 
outcome as two separate and distinct injuries. This Comment proposes 
the adoption of only the proportional approach. Any time loss of chance 
is argued, because it is a separate and distinct injury from the ultimate 
outcome, it will be its own cause of action. And even if the lost chance is 
51% or greater, regardless of the starting point, damages will still be 
applied proportionally. If the plaintiff wants to prove proximate cause 
for the ultimate outcome, that is fine. The plaintiff is free to argue both, 
277. See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 631, 664 P.2d 474 
(1983) (Pearson, J., concurring) (noting that a lost chance of greater than 50% satisfies proximate 
cause for the ultimate injury).  
278. See Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 850, 313 P.3d at 441. 
279. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 614, 664 P.2d at 477 (lead opinion). 
280. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 851, 313 P.3d at 441.  
281. Id. at 841–42, 313 P.3d at 437 (noting that the jury found the defendant reduced chances of 
survival by 70%, but was not the proximate cause of death).  
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but the plaintiff should not argue a loss of a 51% or greater chance to 
prove proximate cause for the ultimate outcome. If the jury decides there 
is proximate cause for the ultimate outcome, the lost chance argument is 
mooted. If, however, the jury finds that the defendant’s negligence 
caused a reduction in the chance for a better outcome, no matter the 
percentage, the plaintiff will still have an avenue of redress, and 
proportional damages will apply. 
B. Evidentiary Standards in a Loss of Chance Case Should Be Stricter 
Loss of chance should be proven by traditional tort standards—duty, 
breach, causation, and damages.282 The burden of proof is by a 
preponderance of the evidence,283 and the evidence will almost always 
require expert testimony. First, the doctor must owe the patient a duty.284 
In the medical malpractice context, there generally must be a physician-
patient relationship,285 or at the least a duty of a health care professional 
to follow the accepted standard of care.286 Second, the plaintiff bears the 
burden to show that the defendant breached that duty by failing to 
conform to the standard of care.287 Loss of chance cases typically 
involve a misdiagnosis.288 However, a misdiagnosis in and of itself is not 
evidence of negligence.289 Rather, the doctor must behave negligently in 
arriving at the wrong diagnosis.290 This must be proven through expert 
testimony establishing the standard of care and how it was breached and 
282. See Koch, supra note 42, at 602 (describing necessary tort standards in a medical 
malpractice case); Férot, supra note 1, at 595 (listing traditional elements of negligence).  
283. See Koch, supra note 42, at 602.  
284. See, e.g., JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS §§ 8.01–8.05 (1996) 
(discussing duty in negligence cases).  
285. See Doyle v. Planned Parenthood, 31 Wash. App. 126, 129, 639 P.2d 240, 242 (1982) (“A 
wrongful act cannot occur after the termination of the physician-patient relationship.”). 
286. See Eelbode v. Chec Med. Ctrs., Inc., 97 Wash. App. 462, 467, 984 P.2d 436, 438 (1999) 
(“[A] claim of failure to follow the accepted standard of care does not require a physician-patient 
relationship.”). This can be misinterpreted to mean that a physician-patient relationship is not 
required to impose a duty on a physician. However, Eelbode stands for the fact that one need not be 
a “physician” to commit medical malpractice. A physical therapist, as was the case in Eelbode, is 
not a physician, and does not have a physician-patient relationship; yet a duty still exists. Id.  
287. See DIAMOND, supra note 284, at § 8.02 (noting that plaintiff must show breach and 
causation in addition to duty). 
288. See Koch, supra note 42, at 603–04 (using medical misdiagnoses for each example). 
289. See Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 327, 622 P.2d 1246, 1259 (1980) 
(holding that a wrong diagnosis by itself is not negligence). 
290. See id. (holding that the doctor must have breached the standard of care in arriving at the 
misdiagnosis).  
 
                                                     
20 - Wurdeman Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2014  12:23 PM 
640 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:603 
how that breach led to the misdiagnosis.291 Third, the plaintiff must 
prove “but-for” cause and effect between the tortious conduct and the 
lost chance.292 But for the defendant’s negligence, the condition would 
have been diagnosed. Or to phrase it more simply, if the doctor was not 
negligent, he or she would have made the correct diagnosis. Fourth, the 
tortious conduct must have been a proximate cause of the lost chance.293 
This principle can be described as the lost chance being within the 
foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence,294 and thus asks: 
if a wrong diagnosis is made in this situation, is it foreseeable that the 
patient will lose a chance at achieving a better outcome? If the trier of 
fact answers no, then the plaintiff’s cause of action fails. If it answers 
yes, then causation is proven for the lost chance but not, however, for the 
ultimate outcome. Finally, the plaintiff must suffer compensable 
harm.295 The compensable harm will be dealt with in more detail in Part 
IV.C. 
Perhaps the most important factor in adhering to the above standards 
is the judge’s role as gatekeeper for the admission of expert testimony. 
Although Washington criminal courts have accepted the Frye296 test,297 
Washington civil courts have neither expressly adopted the Frye test, nor 
have they expressly rejected the Daubert298 test for the admission of 
expert testimony.299 The Washington State Supreme Court held that 
“[e]vidence must be probative and relevant, and meet the appropriate 
standard of probability.”300 And while the Frye test has not been 
officially adopted in civil cases, “scientific evidence must satisfy the 
Frye requirement that the theory and technique or methodology relied 
291. See Smith v. Shannon, 100 Wash. 2d 26, 33, 666 P.2d 351, 356 (1983) (noting that expert 
testimony is required for matters involving medical science). 
292. See DIAMOND, supra note 284, at §§ 11.01–11.04 (discussing cause-in-fact). 
293. See id. § 12.01 (giving an overview of proximate cause). 
294. See id. § 12.03 (explaining different proximate cause tests). 
295. See id. § 3.01 (providing an overview of negligence). 
296. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring that there must be 
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community of the theory proffered by the expert).  
297. See Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 172 Wash. 2d 593, 602, 260 P.3d 857, 861 
(2011) (“Washington courts, at least in criminal cases, have long adopted the Frye ‘general 
acceptance’ standard.”).  
298. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 US. 579, 591 (1993) (requiring a court to 
determine if the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and can 
be applied to the facts at hand).  
299. See Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 172 Wash. 2d at 602, 260 P.3d at 861–62 (“In civil cases, we 
have neither expressly adopted Frye nor expressly rejected Daubert.”).  
300. Id. at 606, 260 P.3d at 863; see also WASH. R. EVID. 401–403; State v. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d 
351, 359, 869 P.2d 43, 47–8 (1994). 
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upon are generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.”301 
Furthermore, “[e]xpert medical testimony must meet the standard of 
reasonable medical certainty or reasonable medical probability.”302 
Because the loss-of-chance doctrine deals with percentages, which are 
easily manipulable,303 the judge’s role as gatekeeper for the admission of 
expert testimony is crucial. 
For example, taking the facts of Herskovits, the expert testimony first 
would be necessary to show the standard of care was breached by not 
initially diagnosing the lung cancer. Next, the expert must show that 
statistically, the chances of survival at one stage are different from 
another stage. This can be done using condensed, yet extensive, 
statistical data based on the survival rates of cancer at the time of 
diagnosis.304 However, the most important piece of expert testimony 
needs to establish that, at the time of the misdiagnosis, the patient was at 
the claimed stage of cancer. This expert opinion can be developed by 
looking at the x-rays,305 although that may be too speculative, as it is 
possible Mr. Herskovits did not, in fact have cancer at the beginning. 
The expert opinion may also be proven if there is statistical data on the 
growth rate of this specific type of tumor.306 If so, the expert can take the 
size of the tumor when it was actually diagnosed, and back date it to 
determine what size the tumor was at the time of the diagnosis, or 
alternatively, if there was a tumor at all. In sum, it is not enough for an 
expert to simply opine there was a loss of chance. She must demonstrate, 
through reliable data and to a degree of reasonable medical certainty 
every aspect of the lost chance. 
301. Anderson, 172 Wash. 2d at 606, 260 P.3d at 863 (citing State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 
719, 684 P.2d 651, 654 (1984)). 
302. Id. at 606–07, 260 P.3d at 864. 
303. For example, an increase from 0.1% to 7.5% is an increase of a factor of 75, or an increase 
of 7,500%. Both are mathematically correct.  
304. See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 843 (Mass. 2008) (giving stage-specific 
cancer survival rates in a special verdict form); King, supra note 25, at 546–47 (“[The doctrine’s] 
successful application depends on the quality of the appraisal of the decreased likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome . . . . ”); see also Mayo Clinic Staff, Cancer Survival Rate: What It Means For 
Your Prognosis, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/ 
cancer/in-depth/cancer/art-20044517 (discussing survival rates of different stages of lung cancer). 
305. See, e.g., Diagnostic Imaging, STANFORD MED. CANCER INST., http://cancer.stanford.edu/ 
information/cancerDiagnosis/diagnosticImaging.html (listing x-rays as one of three types of 
imaging used to diagnose cancer) (last visited May 8, 2014). 
306. See, e.g., Harald Weedon-Fekjaer et al., Breast Cancer Tumor Growth Estimated Through 
Mammography Screening Data, 10 BREAST CANCER RES., no. 3, 2008, available at http://breast-
cancer-research.com/content/pdf/bcr2092.pdf (“Tumor growth can be estimated by comparing 
tumor sizes from clinical-detected and screening-detected cases . . . .”). 
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C. In Order to Accurately Calculate Damages, the Ultimate Harm 
Must Occur 
Mohr and Dormaier did not specify whether the ultimate outcome 
must come to pass, even though it is not the compensable injury. This 
Comment argues that the harm must come about. This may seem 
confusing at first, especially since this Comment advocates that the lost 
chance and the harm must be kept separate. While the lost chance and 
the harm are separate, they are also complementary, and necessary in 
terms of calculating damages. If the ultimate outcome is death, but the 
defendant’s negligence was not the proximate cause of the death, 
damages will be what would have been awarded had the defendant 
legally caused the death, multiplied by the percentage of chance lost. For 
example, in Dormaier, the damages were calculated at $1,300,000.307 
Applying the proportional approach, based on the jury’s verdict, the 
award should have been 0.70 x 1,300,000 = $910,000. 
There may be a case where the harm has yet to come about.308 This 
may be handled by relaxing the statute of limitations, and allowing for 
suit to be brought when the harm materializes.309 An argument has been 
made to allow damages for mental distress, but this seems too attenuated 
a claim, especially if redress is available due to a relaxed statute of 
limitations.310 This ensures that defendants are not liable for a harm that 
may never come about, resulting in a windfall to the plaintiff. 
In addition to requiring the ultimate negative result, courts should be 
careful not to award damages that would have been incurred anyway. 
For example, in Dickhoff v. Green,311 a recent Supreme Court of 
Minnesota case in which the court recognized the proportional approach, 
the plaintiff baby had a visible tumor that went undiagnosed for a year 
before treatment began.312 However, the trial court correctly refused to 
award damages for past medical expenses, and pain and suffering.313 
Had the plaintiff been diagnosed initially, she would still have had to 
undergo all the same treatments.314 These are the types of damages that 
307. Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, 177 Wash. App. 828, 842, 313 P.3d 431, 
437 (2013).  
308. King, supra note 23, at 510–11. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. at 511–15. 
311. 836 N.W.2d 321, 326–27 (Minn. 2013). 
312. Id. at 324–27. 
313. Id. at 327. 
314. Id. 
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should be avoided. 
D. Relative Proportional Percentages Must Be Avoided 
Relative proportional damages take into account the absolute 
percentage of the chance lost.315 For example, a patient who went from a 
40% chance of survival to a 20% chance of survival would not have lost 
a 20% chance, but a 50% chance. Under relative proportionality, the 
starting percentage is the absolute total. It is no longer on a 100% 
scale.316 A patient who went from a 4% chance of survival to a 1% 
chance of survival would have lost a 75% chance, not 3%. This brief 
analysis of the math of the relative proportional approach shows the 
relative proportional approach’s inherent unfairness to defendants. 
E. The Conjunction Principle Should Not Be Employed 
Damages and liability imposed based on the conjunction principle 
should also be avoided.317 The conjunction principle is a type of loss of 
chance twice imposed. A good example may be found in the Illinois 
Court of Appeals decision Bishop v. Tri County Radiologists Ltd.,318 in 
which the plaintiff alleged there was a 10% to 20% chance the patient’s 
cancer was in stage I rather than stage II when it was misdiagnosed and, 
if so, the patient would have had a 40% to 50% better chance at 
survival.319 The 10% to 20% chance of the cancer being in an earlier 
stage does not meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, 
however some scholars would have loss of chance, in effect, applied 
twice.320 Damages would be calculated based on the conjunction 
principle.321 The conjunction principle multiplies both percentages by 
each other and then multiplies that amount by the award for the ultimate 
outcome.322 In Bishop, for example, assume damages for death were 
valued at $100,000, the chance the cancer was in another stage at 
315. Zaven T. Saroyan, The Current Injustice of the Loss of a Chance Doctrine: An Argument for 
a New Approach to Damages, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 16–17 (2003). 
316. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (providing a more in-depth explanation of the 
difference between relative and proportional percentages). 
317. See King, supra note 25, at 554–56 (explaining the conjunction principle). 
318. 653 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
319. Id. at 421–22.  
320. See, e.g., King, supra note 25, at 536–39, 554–56 (advocating for the application of the 
conjunction principle). 
321. Id. at 554–56. 
322. Id. 
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misdiagnosis was 10%, and the lost chance as a result of the 
misdiagnosis was 40%. The equation would be 0.10 x 0.40 x $100,000 = 
$4,000. The miniscule damages indicate it is unlikely a plaintiff will 
employ this principle; however it is an unnecessary complication and 
should not be used. 
The conjunction principle may also be used by defendants to mitigate 
damages. For example, if the test upon which the expert bases her 
opinion has a known error rate of 10%, defendants could ask the jury to 
apply the conjunction principle to account for the error rate.323 Thus, if 
the lost chance was 30% and the known error rate was 10%, we would 
multiply 30% times 90% (accounting for the 10% error rate) to arrive at 
a total lost chance of 27%.324 Again, this is too complicated and should 
not be allowed by either side. If there is a question as to the reliability of 
the evidence, it should fall on the judge, as the gatekeeper, to determine 
its admissibility. It should not be collaterally attacked through the 
conjunction principle. 
F. Loss of a Chance Should Be a Judge-Made Tort and Not Forced 
into an Existing Statute 
It is unclear whether loss of chance may be brought under 
Washington’s wrongful death statute325 or its medical malpractice 
statute.326 This Comment advocates for a judge-made tort, as opposed to 
trying to fit the doctrine into an existing statute. Such an approach 
created great confusion in the Dormaier decision.327 However, if the 
doctrine were to be housed under a statute, the medical malpractice 
statute328 is more appropriate as it uses the language “injury”, and loss of 
chance has been classified as an injury. Under the wrongful death 
statute, Judge Pearson classified the loss of chance—for purposes of 
fitting it into the statute—as the “cause” of the patient’s death.329 That 
classification is part of what led to future confusion. In the absence of a 
judge-made tort, and because loss of chance under the proportional 
323. See, e.g., King, supra note 25, at 555 (accounting for a 15% false negative rate, and 
therefore multiplying the lost chance by .85 in arriving at net lost chance). 
324. See id.  
325. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (2012). 
326. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (2012). 
327. See supra Part II.D.1. 
328. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040. 
329. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 634, 664 P.2d 474, 487 
(1983) (Pearson, J., concurring).  
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approach is the injury itself, the medical malpractice statute, Revised 
Code of Washington section 7.70.040, is a more fitting home for the 
doctrine. If the ultimate outcome relating to the lost chance is death, 
Washington’s survival statute, Revised Code of Washington section 
4.2.046,330 permits the bringing of the lost chance claim under the 
medical malpractice statute because had the patient survived, the patient 
could have brought that cause of action. 
G. A Loss of Chance Cause of Action Must Be Raised in the 
Complaint 
If a plaintiff wishes to argue loss of chance, the plaintiff must raise it 
in the pleadings. The defendant must be fairly in a position to obtain 
experts familiar with the science at issue and to present relevant 
evidence to the jury. Fairness requires that the defendant know from the 
very start that the defendant is defending not just causation for the 
ultimate outcome, but against loss of chance as well, so that an 
appropriate approach to discovery can be taken. The Dormaier Court—
in justifying why loss of chance need not be pleaded—stated that “a 
complaint must identify the legal theory upon which the plaintiff seeks 
relief.”331 The loss-of-chance doctrine is a different theory upon which 
to seek relief, distinct from the ultimate harm. Therefore, the complaint 
should identify the loss of chance as a separate cause of action. As 
demonstrated by the Dormaier decision, the loss-of-chance doctrine can 
have significant impacts on the defense’s theory of the case. If the 
defendant thinks he or she is defending solely against a wrongful death 
claim, the defendant will focus on whether negligence caused the death. 
If, during trial, the plaintiff elicits testimony to the effect of a 50% loss 
of chance (especially when, as in Dormaier, the plaintiff also argued a 
90% loss of chance),332 the plaintiff now has a new cause of action to 
bring to the jury. This in effect allows the plaintiff to hedge her bets at 
the expense of the defendant. This can also confuse the jury—as may 
have been the case in Dormaier333—causing the jury to unwittingly grant 
proximate cause of the ultimate outcome. Furthermore, if the defense is 
on notice for wrongful death, and argues the negligence caused only a 
330. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (2012). 
331. Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, 177 Wash. App. 828, 854, 313 P.3d 431, 
443 (2013). 
332. Id. at 852, 313 P.3d at 442. 
333. The jury found that defendant’s negligence caused a 70% loss of chance, but was not the 
proximate cause of death. Id. at 841–42, 313 P.3d at 437.  
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20% loss of chance, as an affirmative defense, the defense has just 
argued itself into a lost chance instruction for the jury. In the interest of 
fairness, and to facilitate discovery, loss of chance should be pleaded in 
the complaint. 
IV. SOLUTIONS IN PRACTICE: APPLYING THE FACTS OF 
DORMAIER TO A CLARIFIED LOSS-OF-CHANCE 
DOCTRINE 
To demonstrate the applicability of the above-suggested solutions 
designed to clarify the application of the loss-of-chance doctrine, this 
Comment will now apply the solutions to the facts of Dormaier. 
Mrs. Dormaier broke her elbow in a fall on September 15, 2007.334 
After receiving emergency care and following up with Dr. Canfield, she 
was scheduled for surgery to repair the fracture on September 20.335 On 
September 18, Dr. Hart conducted a preoperative evaluation and 
concluded she was fit for surgery.336 The next day, Mrs. Dormaier 
complained of chest and hip pain, and shortness of breath.337 Dr. 
Canfield ordered hip x-rays, which showed no fractures, and chest x-
rays, which revealed patchy infiltrate338 or atelectasis339 in one lung.340 
The doctors concluded the atelectasis was a result of her shallow 
breathing due to pain, and decided to go ahead with the planned 
surgery.341 Mr. Misasi, her nurse anesthetist on the day of surgery, 
consulted with Dr.’s Hart and Canfield and anesthetized her at 12:10 
p.m.342 Mrs. Dormaier suffered a cardiac arrest during surgery and 
passed away at 3:00 p.m.343 The autopsy showed that a large blood clot 
had detached from a pelvic deep vein thrombosis in her hip and blocked 
her lung arteries.344 In the hours and days leading up to her death, many 
334. Id. at 836, 313 P.3d at 434.  
335. Id. at 837, 313 P.3d at 434. 
336. Id. 
337. Id. 
338. Id. at 837 n.1, 313 P.3d at 434 n.1 (“‘Patchy infiltrate’ is the displacement of air space by an 
infiltrating substance in the lung. It is a nonspecific chest x-ray finding that could indicate, for 
example, atelectasis, pneumonia, or pulmonary embolism.”). 
339. Id. at 837 n.2, 313 P.3d at 434 n.2 (“‘Atelectasis’ is the collapse of tiny air sacs in the 
lung.”). 
340. Id. at 837, 313 P.3d at 434 
341. Id. 
342. Id. at 835–38, 313 P.3d at 435.  
343. Id. at 837–38, 313 P.3d at 435. 
344. Id.  
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smaller blood clots had been lodging in her lung arteries.345 The pelvic 
deep vein thrombosis (PDVT)346 “released many smaller emboli, which 
caused survivable pulmonary embolisms, but finally released a large 
embolus, which caused a fatal pulmonary embolism.”347 Following the 
close of evidence, the plaintiff successfully requested a loss of chance 
jury instruction.348 The jury found that Mr. Misasi’s negligence was not 
the proximate cause of Mrs. Dormaier’s death, but did cause a 70% loss 
of chance of survival.349 
The facts of Dormaier do warrant the bringing of a loss of chance 
cause of action. However, as the following application will demonstrate, 
certain requirements must be met in the interests of clarity and fairness. 
First, loss of chance as a cause of action must be pleaded in the initial 
complaint. It may be brought under Washington’s medical malpractice 
statute,350 or by its standing as a judge-made tort. Even though the 
ultimate outcome in this case is death, the lost chance is the actionable 
injury, and thus not bringing the claim under the wrongful death statute 
is appropriate. In Dormaier, the plaintiff only pleaded that the 
defendant’s negligence resulted in Mrs. Dormaier’s death,351 which, 
under the proposed solutions, would not allow for a lost chance jury 
instruction. The plaintiff is free to plead loss of chance, regardless of the 
starting or total percentage, but a lost chance argument of 50%–90% is 
too broad. Because loss of chance may now be pleaded at any 
percentage, there is no longer a need for the plaintiff’s attorneys to 
“hedge their bets” in assigning percentage lost, being certain to hit the 
50% or below benchmark. Therefore, the plaintiff can be, and should be, 
more precise in assigning the percentage lost. At the time of pleading, 
the exact or estimated percentage lost may not be definitively 
established, but pleading the cause of action will at least put the defense 
on notice that it will be defending against a distinct claim. 
Furthermore, pleading loss of chance would not, in this case, 
foreclose the option of pleading wrongful death. The two may be 
345. Id. at 838, 313 P.3d at 435. 
346. Id. at 838 n.4, 313 P.3d at 435 n.4 (“A blood clot is a thrombus when attached to a blood 
vessel wall and an embolus when detached and migrating through the bloodstream. A pelvic deep 
venous thrombosis is the formation of a thrombus in the hip’s deep veins. A pulmonary embolism is 
the lodging of an embolus in the lung’s arteries.”). 
347. Id. at 838, 313 P.3d at 435. 
348. Id. at 840–41, 313 P.3d at 436–37. 
349. Id. at 841–42, 313 P.3d at 437. 
350. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (2012). 
351. See Joint Brief of Appellants at 12, Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, 177 
Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013) (No. 30864-2-III).  
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pleaded in the alternative. However, in employing solely the 
proportional approach, a lost chance of 51% or greater will only result in 
proportional damages. It will not morph into the all-or-nothing approach 
to qualify as proximate cause for the wrongful death.352 
Second, once pleaded, it is crucial that the judge, as gate keeper, 
adhere to strict evidentiary standards. The admissibility of evidence is 
where the Dormaier trial court fell short. Based on the evidence 
presented, the case should have been dismissed as a matter of law for 
failure to provide evidence of causation for the lost chance or death.353 
In its summary of the facts the Court of Appeals stated that “a pelvic 
deep vein thrombosis initially released many smaller emboli, which 
caused survivable pulmonary embolisms, but finally released a large 
embolus, which caused a fatal pulmonary embolism.”354 However, the 
testimony used at trial, and cited by the Court of Appeals, dealt with the 
small, survivable pulmonary embolisms, not the large, fatal embolus 
from the PDVT.355 Had Mrs. Dormaier been diagnosed with these 
“survivable pulmonary embolisms,” she would have had a 90% chance 
of survival. However, the pulmonary embolisms present before surgery 
did not kill her. It was the detachment of a massive one-centimeter 
embolus from her hip that blocked the artery that feeds both lung 
branches.356 The plaintiff’s expert testimony also admitted that 
administering heparin would not have dissolved the fatal clot in time; 
that even if detected, a skilled surgeon would have needed to be present 
to remove the clot in time; and did not opine as to the probability of 
survival of patients with very large pelvic clots.357 Because the evidence 
presented did not show that any action or inaction by Mr. Misasi 
impacted Mrs. Dormaier’s chances of survival, the testimony was 
insufficient to allow the case to continue. 
Therefore, under the proposed solutions of this Comment, the 
evidence must accomplish two things. First, the evidence must purport to 
establish that the defendants negligently failed to diagnose Mrs. 
Dormaier’s PDVT, not that they negligently failed to diagnose a 
352. See infra Appendix A; Appendix B; Appendix C. 
353. See Rasmussen v. Bendotti, 107 Wash. App. 947, 958, 29 P.3d 56, 62 (2001) (“The 
consideration is whether the ultimate result and the defendant’s acts are substantially connected, and 
not too remote to impose liability.”).  
354. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 837–38, 313 P.3d at 435 (emphasis added). 
355. Id. at 839–40, 313 P.3d at 435–36. 
356. Joint Reply Brief of Appellants at 8–10, Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, 
177 Wash. App. 828, 313 P.3d 431 (2013) (No. 30864-2-III). 
357. Id. at 9–12. 
 
                                                     
20 - Wurdeman Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2014  12:23 PM 
2014] LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE 649 
condition that did not cause her death. At the very least, testimony 
should be given to the effect that Mrs. Dormaier’s pulmonary embolisms 
should have been diagnosed, and the presence of such, in conjunction 
with her unexplained hip pain would have led a reasonable doctor to 
conduct further tests to check for PDVT. Second, the evidence must 
show—on a diagnosis of the PDVT—what the chances are of breaking 
up the PDVT using heparin. For example, testimony would need to 
establish that when a PDVT of “x” size is diagnosed and promptly 
treated, the chances of an embolus detaching and creating a fatal 
pulmonary embolism are “y%.” 
Not only must this evidence be presented, it must also be reliable. As 
Mohr indicates, this needs to be shown, among other things, through 
data.358 In Dormaier, Dr. Swenson testified that “[i]t’s been my 
experience over the entire time of my career that if we can diagnose this, 
we have a good chance once beginning therapy to take a mortality rate 
of possibly 70 to 80 percent, and bring it down into the 10 to 20 percent 
rate.”359 The actual lost percentage is 50% to 70%, but testimony was 
also elicited that the lost percentage was 90%.360 Notwithstanding the 
fact that this testimony pertained to a condition that did not kill Mrs. 
Dormaier, this was based on the doctor’s experience, not data. How can 
a trier of fact know if these percentages are accurate? Did the doctor 
compile patient data in order to arrive at this percentage? Did he use 
recognized studies? Furthermore, per Akzo, an argued lost chance of 
50% to 90% does not fall within a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty.361 A lost chance spanning 40% is simply too broad. 
As for the application of the other proposed solutions: (1) the ultimate 
outcome did come to pass; (2) avoiding relative proportionality depends 
on the lost chance percentage settled on. For example, if Mrs. 
Dormaier’s chances of survival went from 90% to 20%, the lost 
percentage is 70%, not the relative proportional percentage of 78%; and 
(3) nothing in the fact pattern suggests the use of a conjunction principle, 
and even if it did, that principle should not be employed. 
To summarize how this Comment’s proposed solutions would deal 
with the Dormaier facts, the plaintiff may maintain a cause of action for 
loss of chance of survival or a better outcome, however certain criteria 
must be met. First, the cause of action must be pleaded in the initial 
358. See Mohr v. Grantham, 172 Wash. 2d 844, 857–58, 262 P.3d 490, 496–97 (2011). 
359. Dormaier, 177 Wash. App. at 839, 313 P.3d at 435. 
360. Id. at 839, 313 P.3d at 436. 
361. See Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 172 Wash. 2d 593, 606–07, 260 P.3d 857, 864 
(2011) (“Expert medical testimony must meet the standard of reasonable medical certainty . . . .”). 
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complaint and brought under Washington’s medical malpractice statute. 
Second, any lost percentage may be claimed. However, regardless of the 
percentage lost, if proven, the lost chance remains the distinct injury and 
does not morph into proximate cause for the ultimate outcome. Finally, 
there must be reliable expert evidence, based on data and experience, 
relating both to the cause of the lost chance, and the reliability of the 
percentage presented. 
CONCLUSION 
The loss-of-chance doctrine has created no small amount of 
confusion, both in Washington and the rest of the country. The path to 
adoption or rejection of the loss-of-chance doctrine is often fraught with 
confusion and misinterpretation. While the doctrine’s heart is in the right 
place, its application can be terribly confusing. Much of the difficulty 
surrounding loss of chance is that “loss of chance” is used as an 
umbrella term for no less than three distinct approaches. The three 
approaches—all-or-nothing, substantial factor, and proportional—have 
different legal requirements and apply differently to the same set of 
facts. To further complicate matters, some states, like Washington, wind 
up employing two approaches, as the proportional approach can morph 
into the all-or-nothing approach after the lost chance is 51% or greater. 
The key is identifying which approach to associate with loss of chance 
and sticking to it. Having the loss of chance stand for two or more 
approaches is untenable and unworkable. This Comment first advocates 
for the proportional approach, applied at any percentage. This eliminates 
the all-or-nothing approach, and keeps the lost chance as a separate and 
distinct injury from the ultimate outcome. Second, this Comment 
advocates for stricter evidentiary standards when dealing with 
percentages and lost chances. Finally, in the interest of fairness, loss of 
chance as a cause of action should be pleaded in the initial complaint. 
The application of the proposed solutions proves that they can, and 
should, be applied in a practical setting. 
APPENDIX 
a. Loss of a Chance Jury Instruction 
 
The loss of a chance is a separate and distinct injury from the ultimate 
outcome. If you find the defendant’s negligence caused the ultimate 
harm or injury to the plaintiff, you do not need to consider loss of a 
chance any further. If, however, you find that the defendant’s negligence 
caused the plaintiff to lose a chance at a better outcome, but did not 
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cause the ultimate harm, the lost chance is the injury, and you must 
decide what percentage the lost chance is. Loss of chance must be 
proven by traditional tort standards. Therefore, the defendant health care 
provider must have owed the patient a duty. The health care provider 
must then have acted negligently. That negligence must have 
proximately caused the lost chance, but not the ultimate outcome. If the 
ultimate outcome was proximately caused by the defendant’s 
negligence, the loss of chance is irrelevant. Damages must be calculated 
proportionally. In order to determine damages, you must first determine 
what the damages would be had the defendant’s negligence caused the 
ultimate outcome. Then you must multiply the damages for the ultimate 
harm by the percentage of the chance lost. 
 
b. Definitions 
 
“Ultimate harm or injury” means the final outcome, i.e., death or 
other significant injury. 
“Loss of chance” is a separate injury, distinct from the ultimate 
outcome. It is the percentage by which the Plaintiff’s chances of 
avoiding the ultimate harm or injury were reduced. 
 
c. Special Verdict Form 
 
1. Was Defendant negligent in his treatment of the Plaintiff? 
 
Answer: 
 
INSTRUCTION: If you answer “no” to Question 1, do not answer any 
other questions. If you answered “yes” to Question 1, proceed to 
Question 2. 
 
2. Was the Defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s 
______________(ultimate injury or harm)? 
 
Answer: 
 
INSTRUCTION: If you answer “yes” to Question 2, do not answer 
Questions 3 or 4, and skip to Question 5. If you answer “no” to Question 
2, proceed to Question 3. 
 
3. Was the Defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s 
lost chance of a better outcome? 
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Answer: 
 
INSTRUCTION: If you answer “no” to Question 3, do not answer any 
other questions. If you answer “yes” to Question 3, proceed to Question 
4. 
 
4. What was the percentage lost? 
 
Answer: ___% 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Proceed to Question 5. 
 
5. What do you find to be the amount of the Plaintiff’s damages? 
(Calculate damages for the ultimate harm, even if you found that the 
Defendant’s negligence was not the proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s 
ultimate harm or injury.) 
 
Answer: $__________ 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: If you answered Question 4, proceed to Question 6. 
If you answered “yes” to Question 2, these are your total damages. 
 
6. Multiply the percentage lost by the damages: 
____% x $_______ = $ ______________ 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: These are your damages for the loss of a chance. 
 
 
